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LONDON, JUNE 23, 1900.

*** The Editor cannot undertake to return rejected contributions, and copies should be kept of all articles sent by writers who are not on the regular staff of the JOURNAL.

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CURRENT TOPICS.

WE PRINT elsewhere a transfer of five actions from Mr. Justice STIRLING to Mr. Justice FARWELL, and of fifteen actions from Mr. Justice BYRNE to Mr. Justice BUCKLEY, and of ten actions from Mr. Justice COZENS-HARDY to Mr. Justice FARWELL, all for the purpose only of hearing or of trial.

MR. JUSTICE MATHEW stated, on the 18th inst., that applications for the transfer of cases to the commercial list having been refused owing to the fact that the list was full until the beginning of the Long Vacation, arrangements had now been made for two courts to sit after the 12th of July for the trial of commercial cases. Applications for transfers which had been refused could therefore now be renewed.

MR. ATTLEE'S statement, at the dinner of the Solicitors' Benevolent Association, that, according to inquiries made by him a few years ago, the average income of solicitors could not be put higher than about £300 a year, is rather startling. It would be interesting to know by what means Mr. ATTLEE obtained the statistics of solicitors' income upon which this conclusion was based; and over how wide or narrow an area the investigation was spread.

FROM THE characteristically modest and graceful speech of Mr. Justice STIRLING, in responding to the toast of the bench at the dinner of the Solicitors' Benevolent Association, it would appear that that learned judge is little aware of the estimation in which he is held by both branches of the profession. He remarked that he was getting old, and that it was "his misfortune—and the misfortune of the public too—that he had recently become senior judge of the Chancery Division," but he hoped that he might be able, with some degree of efficiency, to discharge for a few months more the duties of his office, by which time he would have achieved the period of fifteen years' service which entitled a judge to relief. We believe that there have been few judges who have more completely obtained the confidence and respect of practitioners than Mr. Justice STIRLING; certainly, if we may venture to say so, there have been few judges whose judgments have developed so remarkably in the sense of becoming from year to year increasingly luminous and instructive. If the learned judge feels himself becoming old, he shews no traces of it in the exercise of his functions—

on the contrary, he seems always to be becoming more clear in his exposition of law and more acute and able in applying the law to the facts of the cases before him. Everyone hopes that, before the fifteen years of which he spoke have expired, he will be raised to the Court of Appeal.

THE REPORT of the Special Committee of the Incorporated Law Society, appointed to inquire into the best means of protecting the profession and the public against malpractices, will be found elsewhere. The conclusions of the committee are mostly in accordance with general anticipation. They recommend an extension of the criminal law with regard to misappropriation of money on securities; they state that, in accordance with a suggestion made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when the Statutory Committee find that there is *primâ facie* evidence of a criminal offence on the part of a solicitor, the Council will at once report the facts to the Public Prosecutor. But the committee are of opinion that the punishment of a solicitor guilty of misappropriation of money ought to be ensured, and that the society should do everything in their power, "whether in support of the Public Prosecutor, or a private complainant, *or independently of either*, to secure that this shall be done." That is to say, in default of the Public Prosecutor or a private complainant, the society is to prosecute at its own expense. The committee admit that the resources of the society, even if properly applicable for the purpose, may be found inadequate for the necessary expenditure, and they suggest an application to Government for a larger grant for the purpose. We imagine it is tolerably clear that in the present condition of the national finances no larger grant will be obtained, except on the terms of the solicitors' certificate duty being increased, which, as we have previously pointed out, would be a monstrously iniquitous course. The Council should be warned that such a proposal will go far to alienate the members of the society and will be seriously resented. It appears to us that the matter of prosecution can be safely left to the Public Prosecutor, and that this part of the report of the committee is a concession to the declamation of certain daily and weekly papers. With regard to the bankruptcy of solicitors, the committee state that it is now the practice of the society to refuse certificates to all persons known to be bankrupt, and they recommend an extension of this practice to all cases of registered deeds of arrangement or assignment for the benefit of creditors. This seems to be a very desirable course.

IT WILL be seen that all the suggestions already noticed are aimed at the punishment of delinquent solicitors. The fear of punishment may possibly have some effect in deterring solicitors from entering on courses which may lead to bankruptcy or criminal liability; but we should have expected that the committee would make some suggestions with a view to promoting the growth of professional rules of conduct, which would be infinitely more effectual for this purpose. They suggest that proper accounts, periodically made up and audited, are a safeguard to the solicitor and his clients; that trust accounts should be kept at a bank in the name of the trustees; that in trusts of any magnitude or complexity the accounts should be periodically audited, and that solicitors should not (except in rare cases) hold money belonging to the clients for any lengthened period. These are all excellent maxims, if a trifle obvious. But we do not find a word in the report relative to the real cause of most of the recent disasters—namely, the engaging in financial operations altogether outside the proper functions of a solicitor. We are constrained to say that in our view the report is singularly inadequate in this respect.

IN THE CASE of *Smith* v. *The Inns of Court Hotel (Limited)* the Court of Appeal refused to grant a new trial as there was evidence of negligence to go to the jury. The court, therefore, declined to express any opinion upon the interesting and important question whether there is an implied warranty on the sale of cooked food in hotels and restaurants that it is fit for consumption. It is very strange that our courts never seem to have directly faced this question. There are, however, some American decisions which are strongly in favour of the existence of such a warranty. BLACKSTONE says: "In contracts for provisions it is always implied that they are wholesome." This statement seems, however, to be much too wide and sweeping, and is far from being supported by authority. There must be many cases in which the buyer of food buys on his own judgment, and in which, from the point of view of contract, the maxim *caveat emptor* applies. But it is submitted that in the case of an ordinary sale of food in a hotel or restaurant there is an implied warranty that the food is wholesome. According to section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, which merely reproduces the common law, there is an implied warranty of quality or fitness for a particular purpose "where the buyer expressly or by implication makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, so as to shew that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment, and the goods are of a description which it is in the course of the seller's business to supply (whether he be the manufacturer or not)". Now, when a man goes to a hotel and orders dinner, it must certainly be considered that he makes known by implication the purpose for which he wants the soup, fish, &c., which he orders. The goods are clearly of a description which it is in the course of the hotel keeper's business to supply. Can it be argued that the buyer does not rely on the seller's skill and judgment in selecting the food? Surely not. The customer is completely in the hands of the hotel keeper. He has no means of exercising any independent judgment—except in an extreme case, where his nose should give him warning—and must necessarily rely on the hotel keeper's judgment. The question, therefore, appears to be answered by the statute, and it seems that the keeper of a hotel or restaurant does impliedly warrant that the food he supplies is fit for consumption, or wholesome. This may press hardly on a hotel keeper in some particular case, but it is certainly the reading of the law which is most conducive to public safety. In fact it is for the benefit of the public that such persons should be regarded as insurers of the wholesomeness of the food they supply; and the only case in which they should be excused where the food is bad, is where some servant deliberately poisons the food. In that case one man ought not to suffer for another's crime.

IN OUR ISSUE for the 3rd of March last (*ante*, p. 271) we commented upon certain proceedings under the Merchandize Marks Act against one of the best known firms of auctioneers in London. The prosecution was under section 2 (2), and charged the firm with selling goods to which a forged trade-mark had been applied. Shortly stated, the facts were that certain china had been sent to the defendants to sell. It apparently bore the mark of the famous factory at Dresden, and was described by the defendants in their catalogue, in good faith, as "Dresden." Before the sale, however, they received a communication throwing doubt on the genuineness of the china, and accordingly they sold it "for what it was," and in such a manner as plainly to warn purchasers that the goods were open to suspicion. Now, the Act provides that it is a good defence to this charge if the accused can prove that, having taken all reasonable precautions, he had at the time of the sale no reason to suspect the genuineness of the trade-mark, *and* that on demand he gave the prosecutor all the information in his power with respect to the person from whom he received the goods, *or* "that otherwise he had acted innocently." The magistrate held that, as the defendants had failed to prove that they had taken all reasonable precautions, and had failed to prove that they had no reason to suspect the genuineness of the trade-mark, therefore they were not within the protective words of the Act. He apparently was of opinion that the Act forbids the sale of goods to which a forged mark is applied unless the seller positively believes the mark to be genuine. In our previous remarks on this case doubt was expressed as to the correctness of this view, and this week in *Christie, Manson, & Co.* v. *Cooper*, the High Court has reviewed the decision, reversed it, and quashed the conviction. The court held that the defendants came within the words "or otherwise acted innocently." Apart from the construction of the Act, this

decision seems only just and fair; for it is hard to imagine how the appellants could have acted more fairly to their customers than by communicating their suspicions to them, and putting them on their guard. It is now settled, however, that the Act is not to be construed so strictly as the magistrate thought. Probably the best exposition of the general effect of the Act is to be found in the case of *Coppen* v. *Moore* (*No.* 2) (1898, 2 Q. B. 306), which was argued before a special court of six judges. From the judgment in that case it may be gathered that where it is proved that an accused person sold goods to which a forged trade-mark was applied, the prosecution need not prove any fraudulent intention, but the burden of proof is shifted upon the accused. Apart from the shifting of the burden, however, the ordinary principles of criminal law apply, and if the accused is able to shew he had not a guilty mind, he should be acquitted. This decision is one of very great importance to auctioneers and others.

THE GOVERNMENT have proposed, and the House of Commons have accepted, what may be assumed to be a final amendment of the appeal clause of the Australian Commonwealth Bill. It may be useful to recapitulate shortly the forms which the clause has assumed. In the draft Bill sent to this country a prohibition was placed on appeals to the Privy Council in matters involving the interpretation of the Federal constitution or of the constitution of a State, unless the public interests of some external part of the Queen's dominions were concerned. Otherwise the right of appeal remained untouched, save that power was left to the Federal Parliament to limit the right. The Imperial Government at first omitted this provision (clause 74 of the schedule) entirely, and by an addition in the body of the Bill expressly reserved the right of appeal as well from the Federal High Court as from the State Supreme Courts. Apparently, therefore, Australia wished to keep from the first all constitutional matters for internal decision, and to be able in the future to restrict appeals in other matters, while the Imperial Government were resolved to preserve the right of appeal unimpaired. It was thought that a compromise had been arrived at in the further amendment which Mr. CHAMBERLAIN announced a month ago. A clause was then suggested which dropped the vague reference to "public interests," and excluded appeals in disputes as to the limits of federal and State powers, save in cases where the executive governments concerned desired an appeal. The power allowing the Federal Parliament to make laws limiting the right of appeal was also restored, subject to an express provision that any such proposed laws should be "reserved" for the Queen's pleasure. Practically this secured to the Australians what they had asked for in the draft Bill, but the scheme would have had the effect of throwing on the Australian executive governments the task of interfering in judicial questions, and Mr. CHAMBERLAIN, from his information as to Australian opinion and feeling, has now thought it safe to alter the clause on this head, and also to bring it still nearer to the ideas held in this country. The prohibition as to appeals in matters of Federal or State powers remains, but it is a prohibitition only against appeals from decisions of the Federal High Court, and even as to these that court is empowered to give leave to appeal. Otherwise the right of appeal remains unaltered, subject only to the power formerly proposed for the Federal Parliament to limit appeals, the Crown's power of veto being expressly maintained. The present clause appears to be ingeniously constructed to preserve appeals so far as is at all consistent with the Australian desire to keep Australian constitutional matters for domestic decision, and it may be hoped that it will provide a solution of the difficulty satisfactory to the federating colonies as well as in this country.

THE RULE which privileges legal professional communications from discovery is subject to the exception that the communications shall not have passed between solicitor and client with the object of contriving a fraud or of effecting an illegal purpose. "Where a solicitor," said TURNER, V.C., in *Russell* v. *Jackson* (9 Hare, p. 392), "is party to a fraud, no privilege attaches to communications with him upon the subject, because the contriving of a fraud is no part of his duty as solicitor; and I think it can as little be said that it is part of the duty of a solicitor to advise his client as to the means of evading the law." In the recent case of *Reg.* v. *Bullivant* (1900, 2 Q. B. 163) this exception was made use of for the purpose of defeating an attempt to evade the revenue laws. An information was filed by the Attorney-General of Victoria in the Supreme Court of that colony against the executors of the will of JAMES AUSTIN, claiming duty on certain property under the Administration and Probate Act, 1890, of the colony. The Act contains a provision that if any person shall make a conveyance of property with intent to evade the payment of duty, the property comprised in the conveyance shall, for the purposes of duty, be deemed to form part of his estate. A somewhat similar provision is contained in section 8 of the Succession Duty Act, 1853. The information alleged that the testator, who died in 1896, had, in 1894 and 1895, executed certain voluntary conveyances of property in Victoria with intent to evade payment of duty. The conveyances, the execution of which was not denied, the defence going only to repel the intent to evade the Act, had been prepared by a firm of solicitors in this country. A commission was issued by the Victorian Court for the purpose of taking evidence here, and, the member of the firm who had acted in the matter having died, an attempt was made to obtain from his surviving partner inspection of documents which might shew the instructions given by the testator. The solicitor admitted the existence of a diary containing the instructions, but declined to produce it on the ground of professional privilege. MATHEW, J., made an order for production, and this order was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Ordinarily, of course, a man has a perfect right to avoid the payment of duty by so arranging his affairs as not to bring himself within revenue statutes, but it is different where the law is expressly aimed at attempts to avoid payment of duty. "Having regard," said ROMER, L.J., to the terms of the Act, which bound the testator and imposed on him a duty and obligation to obey it, he would, in making a transfer of property with intent to evade its provisions, be doing what was rendered by it wrong and improper, and any documents which directly tend to support the allegation that he has made such a transfer contrary to the provisions of the Act ought to fall within the same rule as applies to the case of fraud or illegality."

A CASE of some importance, affecting the jurisdiction of the county courts under special statutes, has recently been determined in the Queen's Bench Division. The case to which we refer is *National Telephone Co.* v. *Tunbridge Wells Corporation* (reported elsewhere). It was there held by the court (GRANTHAM and CHANNELL, JJ.), that the effect of the Telegraph Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 59), is to destroy the right of appeal to the county court from the refusal of highway authorities to sanction alterations in their streets (as by laying wires thereunder) where the parties complaining of such refusal are private companies or persons to whom the Postmaster-General has delegated, by licence under section 5 of the said Act, the powers conferred upon him by the Telegraph Acts, 1863 and 1878, though the last-named statute expressly provides, by section 4, for an appeal to a stipendiary magistrate or county court judge from the refusal of any highway authority to give its consent to the Postmaster-General placing telegraphs, &c., under a street, and empowers a county court judge to hear and determine such a "difference," when it arises, "*as if he were an arbitrator under the Regulation of Railways Act*, 1868." It follows, therefore, from this decision, that the delegates of statutory powers conferred on the Crown cannot exercise the right of appeal possessed by the latter, while it still retained such powers, but, on the contrary, must submit to having proposed works in streets vetoed by highway authorities, with whom the final decision in such cases now rests. It was also held, in the case under consideration, that, under the circumstances above mentioned, the proper remedy was prohibition, as the county court judge was acting in his judicial capacity, and not as an arbitrator, notwithstanding the words of section 4 of the Telegraph Act, 1878, already set out in italics.

THE CASE of *Stead* v. *Moore*, before the Court of Appeal last week, was an illustration of the difficulty of assigning the

liability to pay compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act where more firms than one are engaged upon the construction of a building. In the present case a firm of builders determined to erect some houses on their land. They erected scaffolding themselves and employed their own workmen for the brick and stone work, and generally superintended the building operations, but they engaged MOORE to do the carpentering. A workman in the employment of MOORE, while engaged in the carpentry work, met his death through a fall from the scaffolding erected by the building owners. Under these circumstances the judge of the Sheffield County Court held that MOORE was the undertaker within the meaning of the Act, and that he, and not the building owners, was liable to pay the compensation claimed by the widow of the deceased workman. His view, apparently, was that there was no general undertaking comprising the whole of the building operations, but that, while the building owners were the undertakers as to the masonry, MOORE was conducting a separate undertaking as to the carpentry; and *Mason* v. *Dean* (1900, 1 Q. B. 770) lends countenance to this view of the facts. The Court of Appeal entertained some doubt about the matter, but they treated the decision as one of fact, and this being so, it was impossible to say that there was no evidence on which the county court judge could find that MOORE was the undertaker. The appeal was therefore dismissed, but the decision cannot be regarded as laying down any principle.

WORDS AS TRADE-MARKS.

THE history of trade-marks consisting of words is a curious and chequered one. From an early period words have been a favourite form of trade-mark (*e.g.*, Eureka, Anatolia, Excelsior), and they have gone on increasing in favour until now they are the most popular kind of trade-marks in the majority of lines of business, although some trades desire that they should not be recognised or protected. When the first Trade-Mark Registration Act was passed in 1875, special and distinctive words used as trade-marks before its date (the 13th of August, 1875) were admitted to registration, but a new trade-mark could not consist solely of a word or words. It was provided that a word or words might be added to a device or signature or other essential particular of a trade-mark. But this gave no protection *qua* trade-mark to such word or words. Then came the Act of 1883, which, by section 64, recognized as a trade-mark "a fancy word or words not in common use," but the courts in interpreting this phrase put such a narrow construction on it that in effect it became practically inoperative, and only two or three word trade-marks, registered under this provision, out of the great number which came before the courts, were held to be "fancy words not in common use." Then came the Act of 1888, which altered section 64, and, while retaining special and distinctive words used as trade-marks before the 13th of August, 1875, substituted for fancy words not in common use the following as sub-sections of section 64 of the Act of 1883: "(*d*) An invented word or invented words; *or* (*e*) a word or words having no reference to the character or quality of the goods, and not being a geographical name." This change in the statutory definition of a word trade-mark was intended to carry out the recommendations of the committee (known as Lord HERSCHELL'S Committee, from his presiding over its labours) which had exhaustively considered and reported upon, among others, word trade-marks.

To anyone who approached the subject from a commercial standpoint it must have been obvious that the object of the Legislature in changing the definition of a word trade-mark was to facilitate, and not to restrict, the registration of word trade-marks, but this was not the view adopted by the courts. In the well known *Somatose case* (*Farbenfabriken, &c., Application*, 1894, 1 Ch. 645, 11 R. P. C. 84) Lord Justice LINDLEY, interposing in the argument of the Solicitor-General, said, "Was it not intended by the Act of 1888 to let in a larger class of words for registration?" To which the Solicitor-General's answer was, "No; the Act was intended to define rather than to enlarge, and to restrict the class of words capable of registration so as to render the duties of the comptroller more easy," and Lord Justice KAY in his judgment said: "I agree with the argument of the Solicitor-General that when the statutes of 1883 and 1888 are compared, the alteration of section 64 was by no means intended to give persons desiring to register a larger right to monopolize words than they had under the former Act and the decisions upon it; but rather, if anything, to restrict that right still further, and to render the duty of the Comptroller more simple and easy." The decision of the House of Lords in the *Solio case* (*Eastman Photographic Materials Co.'s Application*, 1898, A. C. 571, 15 R. P. C. 476) shews that the Solicitor-General's argument and Lord Justice KAY's decision were wrong, and that the suggestion of Lord Justice LINDLEY was right. Up to the time the *Solio case* was decided by the House of Lords, the Patent Office and the courts put such an erroneous construction on sub-section (*d*) and such a harsh construction on sub-section (*e*) that traders who wished to register words as trade-marks were not much, if at all, better off under the Act of 1888 than they were under the Act of 1883. It was held that sub-section (*d*) must be read by the light of sub-section (*e*) notwithstanding that the disjunctive "or" came between them, and therefore that an invented word must have no reference to the character or quality of the goods for which it was sought to be registered as a trade-mark. This principle of construction was applied in the *Somatose case*. There the Comptroller had refused to register "Somatose" as a trade-mark for a pharmaceutical product (being in fact a powder intended to be taken as a support for the human system) on the ground that it had reference to the character or quality of the goods in question. NORTH, J., upheld the decision of the Comptroller, and on appeal KAY, L.J., and SMITH, L.J., upheld the decision of NORTH, J., on the ground that a descriptive word was not an invented word, and that "Somatose" was derived from the Greek σωμα, with an ordinary termination appended thereto. SMITH, L.J., said in the course of his judgment: "I cannot bring myself to hold that the words 'Somatose,' mainly composed of the words σωμα or σωματος, which means the body or of the body, has no reference to the character or quality of the applicants' goods, which are made of meat, and can easily be absorbed in the body." LINDLEY, L.J., while agreeing that a descriptive word could not be an invented word, held that "Somatose" was an invented word and had no reference to the character or quality of the goods. He said: "What character or quality does the word refer to? I am wholly unable to answer this question. The utmost that can be said is, that 'Somatose' refers in some way to some kind of body."

We now come to the consideration of the *Solio* case. In that case the Eastman Co. applied to register "Solio" for photographic paper. The Comptroller refused the application ont he ground that "Solio" had reference to the character or quality of the goods. On the matter coming into court, KEKEWICH, J., upheld the decision of the Comptroller, and the applicants brought the matter before the Court of Appeal, who upheld the decision of KEKEWICH, J., being of opinion that "Solio," although "a coined word," had reference to the character or quality of photographic paper, and therefore was not registrable as an invented word. LINDLEY, L.J., in the course of his judgment, said: "It is rather strong to say that such a word as 'Solio' has no reference to the character or quality of photographic paper. It is only another name, and would suggest to anybody that it is another name, for 'sun' paper—paper in connection with photography—paper prepared and intended to be sensitive to light." The applicants, nothing daunted, carried the case to the House of Lords, and that tribunal overruled the courts below, and decided (1) that the phrase "invented word or words" in sub-section (*d*) was not qualified by the condition that they shall have no reference to the character or quality of the goods—*i.e*, that the qualification was not to be read into sub-section (*d*) from sub-section (*e*) as had previously been held in the courts below; (2) that "Solio" was an invented word; (3) that "Solio" did not indicate the character or quality of the goods. Lord HERSCHELL said: "I think it unimportant, if it be an invented word, whether it has reference to the character or quality of the goods or not; but if this were the test of the validity of the word as a trade-mark, I must say that I think there is no such reference. I daresay that it might occur to some minds given to etymology that *sol*, the Latin word

for sun, was a component part of it when they found it connected with photographic paper, but the same minds would equally find other root bases for the word if they found it connected with boots or agricultural implements. It seems to me to have no reference to the character or quality of the goods in the sense in which those words must have been used by the Legislature."

It had, before this case, been the practice of the Patent Office to refuse registration as trade-marks in respect of photographic papers of words which consisted merely of the word "sun" or its equivalent "sol," or either of these words with the addition of some ordinary termination. This practice was of course knocked on the head by the decision of the House of Lords, and immediately after this decision the Patent Office executed a regular *volte face*, and in lieu of microscopically scrutinizing every word tendered for registration as an invented word and in most cases unearthing some strained or supposed reference to the character or quality of the goods, and on that account rejecting the word, they have gone to the other extreme, and will now pass for registration, if not otherwise objected to, words which would appear to the ordinary mind as unworthy of the designation of invented words, and also as being words in which a monopoly ought not to be conferred on any individual trader. A few instances of words which have so passed muster, as appears from recent numbers of the *Trade-Mark Journal*, are "Perfumette," for perfumes; "Enameline," for blacking, &c.; "Detergene," for goods in Class 47; "Glazo," for creams and polishes, &c., for leather; and last, and not least in absurdity, "Fireproofine," for a liquid for rendering articles fireproof. It, of course, occurred to the Patent Office that, in allowing a trader to register a common English descriptive word, with a common termination affixed to it, as an invented word, they were lending colour to a claim by such trader to prevent others from using the common English expression which was the root of his so-called invented word, either *per se* or with some other termination affixed to it—*i.e.*, that the lucky owner of "Fireproofine" might object to another using "fireproofette" or "fireproof" without any termination at all. The Patent Office have obviated this to their own satisfaction by requiring a disclaimer in the case of such words as those under consideration. Thus they made it a condition of accepting "Fireproofine" that the applicant should state in his application that "no claim is made to the exclusive use of the word fireproof." A similar statement was of course required by the applicants for "Perfumette" and "Detergene" and the applicant for "Glazo" was required to make a similar statement as to the word "glaze." The curious feature of this system is that it appears to us that the Patent Office has no jurisdiction, or at all events no sufficient jurisdiction, to insist upon any such statement by way of disclaimer. The only sections of the Patents, Designs, and Trade-Marks Act providing for disclaimer are sections 64 (2) and 74 (2), neither of which covers such a disclaimer as the Patent Office insists on in the case of an invented word. If, therefore, the Patent Office can justify insisting upon such a disclaimer it can only be because section 62 (1) says: "The comptroller *may*, on application by or on behalf of any person claiming to be the proprietor of a trade-mark, register the trade-mark," and that this has been held to confer a discretion as to registering on the Comptroller. Consequently it might be contended that it gives the Comptroller power to impose conditions upon the registration of a trade-mark which are not imposed by statute. We cannot think that this contention would prevail if the matter came before the High Court.

One of the most recent cases in which the matter under consideration has come before the courts is that of *Field's Trade-Mark* (17 R. P. C. 266). There Messrs. J. C. & J. Field registered in 1890 for common soaps, detergents, and soft soaps the word "Savonol," which they used largely in respect of soft soaps. A motion was made to expunge this mark from the register, and the ground mainly relied on was that it was not an invented word, being in fact the French word "savon" with the termination "ol." It was proved or admitted in the case that "savon" had been used for many years as part of the title of toilet soaps, both made in England and imported into England—*e.g.*, Cook's "Savon de Luxe," Yardley's "Savon Velours," and Price's "Savon Regina." It was contended in support of the motion that "savon" was a common word in the soap trade, and that to take that word and add a short meaningless syllable to it was not to invent a word, and reliance was placed upon what Lord Shand said in the House of Lords in the *Solio case*: "It is not possible to define the extent of invention required, but the words, I think, should be clearly and substantially different from any word in ordinary and common use. The employment of a word in such use, with a diminutive or a short and meaningless syllable added to it, or a mere combination of two known words would not be an 'invented' word; and a word would not be 'invented' which, with some trifling addition or very trifling variation, still leaves the word one which is well known or in ordinary use, and which would be quite understood as intended to convey the meaning of such a word." Mr. Justice Buckley, before whom the motion came, held that "Savonol" was an invented word. In his judgment he referred to the *Solio case*, and after referring to the opinions of the Lord Chancellor and Lord Herschell, he quoted the following from the opinion of Lord Macnaghten: "If it is an invented word, if it is 'new and freshly coined' (to adapt an old and familiar quotation), it seems to me that it is no objection that it may be traced to a foreign source, or that it may contain a covert and skilful allusion to the character or quality of the goods. I do not think that it is necessary that it should be wholly meaningless." Then, referring to the opinion of Lord Shand quoted above, he said that he did not understand Lord Shand as meaning to express anything differing from the learned lords who preceded him or as quarrelling with what Lord Macnaghten said in the passage from his opinion above referred to. The learned judge said that "Savonol," to his mind, meant nothing at all, and that it was an invented word. If Buckley, J., is right in his judgment, all that a trader need do if he wishes to lay a ground for claiming—we do not say, of course, successfully claiming—a monopoly in a foreign word, even though it be current in his trade, is to register that word with the termination "ol" affixed thereto as a trade-mark—"vinol" for wine, and "Eau-de-Colognol" for perfume, were suggested in argument. These words do not commend themselves to us, and we do not think they would pass muster if they came before Lord Shand. It may very well be that Lord Shand did not intend to quarrel with Lord Macnaghten's statement, but on the other hand, if Lord Shand had preceded Lord Macnaghten, we do not think that the latter would have quarrelled with what was said by Lord Shand. Lord Shand's statement is plain and obvious, and so also is Lord Macnaghten's, and the two do not in fact conflict. Lord Macnaghten was overruling the previous practice of the Patent Office of searching for a hidden or disguised meaning in a word and then rejecting it on account of such meaning. Lord Shand was laying down the rule that you cannot take a word from the common vocabulary of the trade and convert it into a trade-mark by adding a diminutive or a short and meaningless syllable to it.

Before parting with the subject, we should mention that in a still later case Cozens-Hardy, J., has held (1) that an invented word need not have been invented by the applicant for registration thereof, which is probably right; and (2) that it is immaterial that there has been "prior publication of the word within the jurisdiction," which, if taken without qualification, is probably wrong.

Mr. Edmund Z. Brodowski, Consul of the United States at Solingen, Germany, has, says the *American Law Review*, transmitted to the State Department the following optimistic account of the workings of the inferior criminal courts of Germany. "It may not be out of place to give my experience as to the German '*Schoeffengericht*,' which in some small degree can be compared with our justice-of-the-peace courts. The court is composed of a professional judge and two assistants (selected from a venire of citizens), the prosecuting attorney, and a minute clerk. The presiding judge does the questioning of the delinquent and of the witnesses, but it is not forbidden for the assistants and the prosecuting attorney to propound questions if they see fit to do so. But the surprising feature therein for the American is the fact that the prosecuting attorney is at the same time the attorney for the accused. After all the questioning has been done, the prosecuting attorney lays before the court the law on the subject. Then the prisoner is asked what he has to say, and in most of these cases appeals to the clemency of the court. The court retires to a private room, returns a few minutes later, and the presiding judge passes the sentence. The sentences are in most cases so mild, and in all cases so just and sensible, that, as one of the judges here has stated to me, not one appeal has been taken throughout this whole year from the decisions of the court."

REVIEWS.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

A Concise Introduction to Conveyancing. By J. ANDREW STRAHAN, M.A., LL.B., Barrister-at-Law. With a Chapter on Registration of Title. By WILLIAM BLYTH, B.A., Solicitor. Butterworth & Co.

The Yearly Digest of Reported Cases for the Year 1899 Decided in the Supreme and other Courts, and a Copious Selection of Reported Cases Decided in the Irish and Scotch Courts, and Lists of Cases Digested, Overruled, Considered, &c., and of Statutes, Orders, Rules, &c., referred to. Edited by EDWARD BEAL, B.A., Barrister-at-Law. Butterworth & Co.

The Intermediate Law Examination Made Easy. A Complete Guide to Self-preparation in the Thirteenth Edition of Mr. Serjeant Stephen's New Commentaries on the Law of England (excluding Books IV. and VI.). Being the Subject selected for the Intermediate Examination of the Law Society. By ALBERT GIBSON. Eleventh Edition. By the AUTHOR and ARTHUR WELDON, Solicitors. The "Law Notes" Publishing Offices.

Food and Drugs. A Manual for Traders and Others. Being a Consolidation of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, Sale of Food and Drugs Act Amendment Act, 1879, Margarine Act, 1887, Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1899. By CHARLES JAMES HIGGINSON, Barrister-at-Law. Effingham Wilson.

A Practical Guide for Sanitary Inspectors. By FRANK CHARLES STOCKMAN. With an Introduction by HENRY KENWOOD, M.B., L.R.C.P., D.P.H. Butterworth & Co.; Shaw & Sons.

CORRESPONDENCE.

OFFICIALISM FROM ITS PRACTICAL SIDE.

[*To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.*]

Sir,—I once thought of writing a paper to be entitled "Officialism from its Comic Side." I abandoned the idea partly because I had not time for the task, but chiefly because I was conscious of my utter inability to do justice to a subject which could hardly be dealt with adequately unless by a writer with the powers of the late Charles Dickens.

But the eccentricities of the various offices are sufficiently amusing, I fancy, to be worthy of an occasional note in your columns, and I send you a recent experience.

Tendering some accounts for estate duty, I stated the actual rent paid for some property and the various deductions. The authorities at Somerset House declined to accept these figures and asked for evidence of the assessment to income tax. I then sent them the receipts for the tax paid. They said these receipts were useless and the surveyor must be applied to to state the amount of the assessment to income tax.

I thereupon wrote to the surveyor explaining the requisition of the Death Duty department and asking him to give me the certificate. His reply is that he is "precluded from supplying the information without authority," but very courteously adds he has applied to the Board of Inland Revenue for that authority. Meanwhile, of course, the winding up of an estate is delayed, and the unfortunate beneficiaries are put to a good deal of annoyance and expense.

I suspect the objection to the evidence of annual value originally tendered to the Death Duty authorities was due to the fact that the clerk whose duty it was to deal with the papers was busy and wanted an excuse to get rid of or postpone attending to them.

Not long since, when I pressed for a set of papers that were being delayed, they came back with a series of statements of the present condition of the law. I returned them at once with a note that I was quite aware of the law as stated, and after another three weeks had elapsed they were returned approved.

Such is officialism: to promote the *cultus* of its great goddess £265,000 is, as Mr. Rubinstein points out, about to be wasted.

Hereford, June 19. H.

THE CAMBRIDGE LAW TRIPOS.

[*To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.*]

Sir,—It will probably interest some of your readers to know that Mr. Wilfred Gordon Brown, who last week was placed at the head of the law tripos at Cambridge, and received the Chancellor's Gold Medal, is a grandson of Mr. Joseph Brown, Q.C., who, now of the age of ninety-one years, is, we believe, the senior Queen's Counsel.

Mr. W. G. Brown is the younger son of Mr. Harold Brown, one of the partners in the firm of Messrs. Linklater & Co., solicitors.

We take an interest in Mr. W. G. Brown, as he was for some time occupying a seat in our office with a view of acquiring some knowledge of the practice.

THORNE & WELSFORD.

17, Gracechurch-street, London, June 21.

CASES OF THE WEEK.

High Court—Chancery Division.

HALL *v.* DUKE OF NORFOLK AND OTHERS. Kekewich, J. 14th June.

MINES—SUBSIDENCE—DAMAGE—LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF PREDECESSOR IN TITLE.

This was an action brought by Mr. John Hall, the owner in fee of the Manor House, Overseal, Ashby-de-la-Zouch, against the Duke of Norfolk, as executor and trustee of the late Lord Donington, Messrs. Wilkinson, Newton & Spalding, and the Moira Colliery Co. (Limited), claiming (1) to have it ascertained what damage the plaintiff's house had suffered by reason of the working out of the main coal seam in the adjoining Moira colliery of the defendants; (2) a declaration that the defendants were liable to make good such damage; and (3) payment accordingly. It appeared that in the years 1889, 1890, and 1891 the late Lord Donington worked the seam. On the 2nd of April, 1892, Lord Donington made his will appointing the Duke of Norfolk, Mr. George Edward Lake, and the Hon. G. T. C. Rawdon Hastings executors and trustees thereof. On the 24th of July, 1895, Lord Donington died and his will was proved by the Duke of Norfolk and G. E. Lake, the other executor renouncing probate. The Duke of Norfolk and G. E. Lake carried on the business of the colliery until the 1st of October, 1895, and afterwards as agents for the defendants Wilkinson, Newton, & Spalding, the lessees of the colliery under a lease of the 16th of November, 1895, for twenty-one years, and on the 20th of November, 1895, the Moira Colliery Co. (Limited) was formed and the lease and the interests under it were assigned to the defendant company. There was no covenant on the part of the lessees to prevent damage by subsidence. In November, 1895, a subsidence occurred and the plaintiff brought his action, Mr. Lake having in the meantime died. The defence was that the defendants had not actively caused the damage and were not therefore liable.

KEKEWICH, J. said that some years ago, in 1889-1891, Lord Donington worked the coal, which he had a perfect right to do. Some years after, towards the end of 1895, the working of the coal caused a subsidence which injured the plaintiff's house, in respect of which he was entitled to recover if he could find the person liable. It was not proved when the subsidence occurred, but it appeared that it did not occur until after November, 1895, when the colliery was demised to the defendants. The plaintiff endeavoured to recover damages against Lord Donington's estate, but that action failed on the ground that it was a personal action which determined with the death of Lord Donington. He then sought to recover against the trustees and the lessees. The executors and trustees worked the coal for a few months, and must be treated as owners, and they then demised the colliery to the defendants, Wilkinson, Newton, & Spalding. It was not suggested that anything done by the trustees or by the lessees caused the subsidence. That was traceable to the working of the seam by Lord Donington during the years 1889-1891. The damage did not occur till towards the end of 1895, and the right of action did not accrue till then; there was, therefore, no question of the Statute of Limitations. If the plaintiff had sued the right defendants, he was entitled to recover. The question was whether the defendants were liable for allowing the nuisance to continue. In the case of *Greenwell* v. *Low Beechburn Coal Co.* (L. R. 2 Q. B. 165) Bruce, J., considered the question, and decided against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendants. It was said that the decision of Bruce, J., was not consistent with that in *Darley Main Colliery Co.* v. *Mitchell* (11 App. Cas. 127), and therefore his lordship thought it was his duty not to treat the question as concluded by Bruce, J., but to examine the question for himself. He had considered all the cases cited (including *Todd* v. *Flight* (9 W. R. 145), *Rex* v. *Pedley* (1 A. & E. 822), *Rich* v. *Basterfield* (4 C. B. 783), *Pretty* v. *Bickmore* (21 W. R. 733)), and unless controlled by *Darley Main Colliery Co.* v. *Mitchell* he was not at liberty to create a new cause of action. Having read the judgment of Bruce, J., he entirely agreed with it. Bruce, J., pointed out (p. 170) that there was no reported case bearing upon the point, and therefore to allow the plaintiff's claim would be to create a new cause of action. In *Darley Main Colliery Co.* v. *Mitchell* the House of Lords decided that a new cause of action arose on each new subsidence. That was the whole decision in that case, but in his lordship's opinion that case was in direct contradiction to the plaintiff's claim. On the point of law, therefore, he was of opinion that the plaintiff's case failed. That being so he need not distinguish between the defendants, nor go into the question whether they might have done something to prevent the mischief. There was no evidence to shew that if the cavity had been filled up the subsidence would not have happened, and, therefore, if he had not decided against the plaintiff on the question of law, he would have decided against him on that ground. There would be judgment for the defendants, with costs.—COUNSEL, *P. O. Lawrence*, Q.C., and *MacSwinney*; *Warrington*, Q.C., and *Kenyon Parker*; *Renshaw* Q.C., and *Ashton Cross*. SOLICITORS, *Woodcock, Ryland, & Parker*, for *Woodcock & Sons*, Haslingden; *Wordsworth, Blake, & Co.*; *Kingsford, Dorman, & Co.*, for *Smith, Mammatt, Hale, & Quarrell*, Ashby-de-la-Zouch.

[Reported by S. E. WILLIAMS, Barrister-at-Law.]

Re **SOMERS. SOMERS** *v.* **ROXBURGH.** Byrne, J. 13th June.

COSTS—LEGITIMACY—OBLIGATION OF SUCCESSFUL PLAINTIFF TO PAY DEFENDANT'S COSTS—DEFENDANT'S ACTION REASONABLE.

Adjourned summons. Between decree *nisi* and decree absolute in certain proceedings in the Divorce Court between a husband and wife, the wife gave birth to a son. Previous to the birth of this child in 1877 there had been no issue of the marriage, and in consequence of the divorce proceedings the husband had bought out the wife's interest in certain settlements made on their marriage, on the footing that, there being no issue, he might thus become absolutely entitled to the settled property. Owing to the birth of this child, the husband took proceedings before Romer, J., in the Chancery Division shortly before the child attained twenty-one, asking for an inquiry whether the child had any interest under the settlements. Romer, J., conceiving that the real question involved was the legitimacy of the child, directed the case to be tried before a jury in the Queen's Bench Division. The case was accordingly tried before the Lord Chief Justice, but the jury were unable to agree. On the case being again heard, the jury decided against the legitimacy of the child. The husband paid his own costs of these proceedings, but declined to pay those of the child. The present summons was therefore taken out to have it declared that the child might have his costs of those proceedings. The child came of age shortly after the proceedings had commenced, and elected to take an active part in them. The contention on behalf of the child was that inasmuch as he was born during the continuance of the marriage tie he was *primâ facie* legitimate and the onus lay upon those who desired to prove the contrary. There was therefore a presumption in his favour that he was interested under the settlements and must be got rid of before the husband could claim to be absolutely entitled to the settled funds. On behalf of the husband it was contended that on the evidence it was clear that the child was illegitimate and that if he had acted reasonably he should have waived his claim which rested solely on a legal presumption. On the part of the child it was urged that his position was analogous to that of an heir-at-law in testamentary cases, and that he ought to have his costs. The husband could not obtain complete control of the settled fund without getting rid of the presumption in favour of the legitimacy of the child. The following cases were referred to: *Wilson* v. *Metcalfe* (3 Mad. 45), *Johnston* v. *Todd* (8 Beav. 489), *Berney* v. *Eyre* (3 Atk. 387), *Wright* v. *Wright* (5 Sim. 449), *Stacey* v. *Spratley* (4 D. G. & J. 199).

BYRNE, J.—The real question here is, Did the child act unreasonably in not waiving his claim to be considered legitimate until the contrary was proved. It is material on this point to observe that on the first trial of the action in the Queen's Bench Division the jury disagreed. The question which the jury had to answer was a difficult one. At law the presumption was that the child was legitimate, and this had to be displaced. The cases cited are analogous to the present case, especially *Johnston* v. *Todd* and *Stacey* v. *Spratley*. The child is entitled to have his costs paid to him out of the trust estate.—COUNSEL, *Levett*, Q.C., and *Austen Cartmell*; *Ingpen*, Q.C., and *Stewart Smith*; *Stokes*. SOLICITORS, *Fladgate & Co.*

[Reported by R. LEIGH RAMSBOTHAM, Barrister-at-Law.]

HAND *v.* **BLOW.** Stirling, J. 13th and 14th June.

LANDLORD AND TENANT—SUB-LEASE TO TRUSTEES OF DEBENTURE DEED—RECEIVER—LIABILITY TO PAY RENT AND DAMAGES.

This was a summons in a debenture-holder's action adjourned into court. The present applicant was the lessor of certain premises (the nature of which, with other facts, is set out in the judgment below), and asked for liberty to distrain for rent and dilapidations, and in default to enter upon the premises and determine the lease, and to have the sums claimed paid out of moneys in the hands of a receiver previously appointed at the instance of the debenture-holders to receive the debts and manage the business of the original lessees.

STIRLING, J., said that this case raised a question apparently novel, which one would have expected to have been decided before. The debentures were secured by a trust deed, charging certain leasehold property of a company in Edgware-road with the debenture debt, and there purported to be a sub-demise to the trustees of the debenture deed. At all events, it was admitted that these trustees were not assignees, but at the most sub-lessees, and so not liable to pay the rent or perform the covenants. Rent (payable in advance) was paid in December, 1899, covering the period to the 25th of March, 1900. On the 29th of August, 1899, an order was made appointing a receiver and manager of the company's business, who accordingly entered into possession on behalf of the debenture-holders. On the 24th of March he removed all the chattels and property of the company; he did not pay the rent due on the 25th of March, but he did not deliver up possession to the landlord. The latter, on the 29th of March, took out a summons asking for liberty to distrain or, in default, to re-enter. On the 9th of May, having obtained leave from the master in chambers, the landlord re-entered. The question now was whether or no it was right and proper that the receiver should be ordered to pay the rent from the 25th of March to the 9th of May, and also dilapidations or damages for breaches of certain covenants in the lease, both claims appearing to be on the same footing. It was clear that, if the trustees had themselves been in possession, they would not have been liable either at law or in equity, there being neither privity of estate or contract: *Ramage* v. *Womack* (1900, 1 Q. B. 116) and *Re Fox, Ex parte Bishop* (29 W. R. 144, 15 Ch. D. 400). Why should the receiver be under any greater liability? It was urged that the court, finding its officer in possession, would compel him to do what was right, honest, and honourable, and should not abstain from compelling him to pay. His lordship had difficulty in the abstract in acceding to that proposition. The law was perfectly clear that a sub-lessee was not liable or bound in honour to perform the sub-lessor's covenants with the head lessor. He might, of course, find his goods distrained upon by the head lessor, or be ejected. There was no reason why here an order should be made against the receiver on general principles. But it was argued that the court had laid down a rule as to an honourable obligation in a certain case. In *Re Oak Pits Colliery Co.* (30 W. R. 759, 21 Ch. D. 322) a liquidator continued in occupation of leasehold property of a company in liquidation, and Lindley, J., said that the landlord ought to be paid by the company. But in the present case his lordship was not winding up the company, but assisting the debenture-holders—equitable mortgagees—to their rights. A case with reference to a receiver was *Balfe* v. *Blake* (1 Ir. Ch. R. 365), where the decision of Brady, L.C., in saying that "this court is bound to act with honesty," was followed later in *Jacobs* v. *Van Boolen* (34 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL 97). But it depended on the principle that the court, being placed in the position of a tenant, was bound to do as a just and honest tenant would do; here that position was not of a tenant, but of a sub-tenant. In the very remarkable case of *Neate* v. *Pink* (15 Sim. 450, 3 M. & G. 476) the principle of *Balfe* v. *Blake* could be applied; but it was a material circumstance that there the landlords recovered judgment against the receiver for rent that was due, and so the court found the relation of landlord and tenant subsisting. Lastly, two cases in bankruptcy were cited where the court ordered a trustee in bankruptcy to return certain funds, and where James, L.J., and Esher, M.R., made observations as to the duty of the court. His lordship, after reading from the judgment of the former in *Re Regent's Canal Ironworks Co., Ex parte Grissell* (3 Ch. D. 411), said that the doctrine must be accepted with some limitations. In this case it seemed to him that he was asked to take the money of the debenture-holders and to apply it in payment of that for which neither their trustee nor the receiver were liable. The summons would be refused, and the costs of the adjournment would follow the event.—COUNSEL, *Upjohn*, Q.C., and *P. Wheeler*; *Martelli*. SOLICITORS, *Duffield, Bruty, & Co.*; *H. E. Warner & Co.*

[Reported by W. H. DRAPER, Barrister-at-Law.]

PHILLIPS *v.* **PHILLIPS.** Byrne, J. 12th June.

PRACTICE—R.S.C. XVIII. 2—RECOVERY OF LAND—JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION—PURCHASER FROM MORTGAGEE IN POSSESSION CO-DEFENDANT WITH MORTGAGEE—MOTION ON WRIT ONLY.

Motion. In this case an action was brought by certain infants by their next friend against C. J. P., who, as it appeared on the face of the writ, was a mortgagee, and who also, as appeared from the form of the writ, was or had been in possession. When the motion was brought on, only the writ in the action had been delivered. The writ asked for (1) and (2) a declaration that the sale purporting to have been made of certain property which appeared to have been mortgaged by the defendant C. J. P. to the defendant A. P. (a married woman) ought to be declared to be void and set aside; (3) a declaration that a certain mortgage whereunder C. J. P. was mortgagee for £1,000 ought to stand as security only for the sums actually advanced with proper interest; (4) accounts to be taken of certain mortgages which, on the face of the writ, were mortgaged properties, and part of which purported to have been sold to A. P.; (5) to redeem the properties comprised in the several indentures of mortgage; (6) an account of certain rents and profits; and (7) delivery up of possession of the mortgaged property. The writ also asked for an injunction, accounts, and inquiries. The defendants now moved under ord. 18, r. 2, for an order that the writ and all proceedings in the action might be set aside upon the ground that the plaintiffs had improperly joined in the writ a claim for possession with other claims not allowed by the rules to be joined with a claim for possession without the leave of the court or a judge. The equity of redemption of the hereditaments comprised in the above-mentioned mortgages were included in a settlement of which one of the trustees, W. H. R., was a plaintiff, who sued personally as well as as trustee, and the other trustee, William John Phillips, was a defendant, and was sued as trustee. The case really turned upon the insertion of clause 7 in the writ.

BYRNE, J.—This case I feel a good deal of difficulty about, chiefly from the fact that no statement of claim has yet been put in, and that I have only the writ to go upon. It is quite within the rights of the defendants to move to stay proceedings or to strike out the writ on the ground that the leave of the court has not been given to join another cause of action with an action for recovery of land. It is said that inasmuch as the request for delivery up of possession applies to all the defendants other than the defendant William John Phillips, who is interested with the plaintiff as trustee of the settlement with the equity of redemption, it is, in effect, asking for delivery up of possession not merely as against a mortgagee, but as against a person claiming to be purchaser and against another person without being dependent or contingent; that this, therefore, ought to be regarded as an action for recovery of land in respect of those defendants, and that those defendants are entitled to claim the benefit of the rule. On the other hand, it is said that the proviso in the rule shews that a plaintiff coming to redeem is entitled to ask for delivery of possession of the mortgaged property, and that as part of such relief; that once having such an action, it is competent for the plaintiff to ask in the same action to set aside the sale purporting to have been made under the mortgage. And it is further said that it is consistent with the case which, in full, it is intended to make, that the order for delivery up of possession is (and that appears to be so on the writ to this extent) contingent upon redemption of the mortgaged premises, and that it is consistent with the case more set out at large, that the offer to redeem is

meant to extend to the defendant, the purchaser, and the other defendants should they shew that, although they are not entitled to have the action dismissed so far as it seeks to set aside the sale of the mortgaged premises, nevertheless they are entitled to be repaid moneys, either because their conveyance in effect has operated as a transfer of the mortgage, or because the sale took place under such circumstances as that such relief ought only to be granted upon the footing of paying any moneys which may have been paid by them. Reading this writ as best I can, and in ignorance of the case as it will be ultimately pleaded at large, I think I should be wrong in holding that this is an action for the recovery of land within the meaning of the order, not subject to the proviso. I think on a fair reading of this I can see that the statement of claim setting out the case in full and yet being consistent with the writ may shew a case entitling the plaintiff to say that the relief he is asking is properly asked in a suit for redemption, and that this ought to be regarded as a suit for redemption. I am rather sorry I have not the statement of claim before me in deciding this matter, but reading it as best I can upon the writ itself I do not see my way to saying that I ought to stay or strike out the proceedings.—Counsel, *R. J. Parker*; *Levett*, Q.C., and *E. P. Hewitt*. Solicitors, *Preston, Stow, & Preston*, for *Ward, Colborne, & Coulman*, Newport, Mon.; *Few & Co.*, for *Bythway & Son*, Pontypool.

[Reported by R. Leigh Ramsbotham, Barrister-at-Law.]

High Court—Queen's Bench Division.

NATIONAL TELEPHONE CO. *v.* TUNBRIDGE WELLS CORPORATION. Div. Court. 18th June.

Prohibition—Telegraph Company—Placing Telegraphic Wires or Tubes under a Street—Necessary Consent of Highway Authority—"Difference"—Former Jurisdiction of Stipendiary Magistrate or County Court Judge to Arbitrate—Telegraph Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 76), ss. 3, 4—Telegraph Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 59), s. 5.

This was an application for a writ of prohibition to issue directed to the county court judge of Kent prohibiting him from further proceeding with a plaint in the county court at Tunbridge Wells whereby the Telephone Co. were the plaintiffs and the corporation the defendants, and the question of law for decision was whether a stipendiary magistrate or a county court judge had jurisdiction to hear and determine an appeal from the refusal of the highway authority to allow a telegraph company to open up streets for the purpose of laying wires or tubes. The special case set out the following facts and sections: By section 6 of the Telegraph Act, 1863, a telegraph company was empowered to break up any street or road, subject to the restriction that they could not place a telegraph under any street of any municipal borough except with the consent of the highway authority. By the Telegraph Act, 1868, s. 2, the same provisions were made to apply to the Postmaster-General. By the Telegraph Act, 1869, s. 4, the Postmaster-General was given the exclusive power of transmitting telegrams, with the exception of telegrams transmitted with his written licence. "Telegrams" has been held to include telephonic messages: *Attorney-General* v. *Edison Telephone Co.* (6 Q B D. 244). By the Telegraph Act, 1878, s. 3, if any highway authority having power to withhold consent to the Postmaster-General to placing telegraphs under a street fail, within twenty-one days after being required, to give their consent, a "difference" shall be deemed to have arisen between such highway authority and the Postmaster-General; and that difference, by section 4, was to be referred to a stipendiary magistrate or to a county court judge, who was empowered to hear and determine such "difference" as if he were an arbitrator under the Regulation of Railways Act, 1868. The magistrate or county court judge might give the necessary consent, which was to have the effect of a consent given to the Postmaster-General by the highway authority under the Act of 1863. By the Telegraph Act, 1892, s. 5, where the Postmaster-General had licensed any company to transmit telegrams, he might licence the company to exercise his own powers under the Acts of 1863 and 1878, and thereupon those Acts should apply. But, notwithstanding anything in the Act of 1878, a licensee should not exercise any of these statutory powers without the consent of the urban sanitary authority or county council, and should be subject to any terms and conditions which the county council or urban sanitary authority might attach to any such consent, and should comply with any regulations of such council or authority from time to time in force in relation to telegraphic lines. By two deeds, the earlier dated in the year 1884 and the later in 1896, made between the Postmaster-General and the National Telephone Co., the company were authorized to work and use certain forms of telegraphs for the purpose of transmitting telegrams within the municipal borough of Tunbridge Wells. By a deed, dated the 10th of March, 1896, and made between the Tunbridge Wells Corporation and the National Telephone Co., the corporation consented to the company, "subject to the provisions of this agreement, exercising within the borough of Tunbridge Wells such powers as might from time to time and at any time be delegated by the Postmaster-General to the company in pursuance of the provisions of section 5 of the Telegraph Act, 1892." This deed contained the following stipulation: "It is expressly agreed that the consent contained in the preceding clause is given upon the following conditions—(1) except as regards the work mentioned in the schedule the company shall not exercise any of the powers conferred on the Postmaster-General by the Telegraph Acts, 1863 and 1878, in respect of which the consent of the corporation is required under the said Acts, without obtaining the further consent in writing of the corporation to be from time to time given to the specific works for the time being proposed to be carried out under such powers, it being intended that the general consent contained in the preceding clause is not to operate to relieve the company from the obligations of obtaining the particular consent of the corporation to such specific work as required by and provided for in the said Acts." Clause 10 of this agreement contained a reference of all disputes and differences under its terms to two arbitrators or an umpire. The company wished to open a street and lay telephone wires and executive works not mentioned in the schedule to the last-mentioned deed. With a view to this they applied for consent of the corporation. This leave was refused, and the company now contended that under section 4 of the Telegraph Act, 1878, they were empowered to refer this "difference" to the county court judge. The county court judge expressed his opinion that he had jurisdiction to hear and determine the difference, but refrained from doing so until the hearing of this motion, which was for a prohibition upon the ground that since the passing of the Telephone Act, 1892, s. 5, the county court judge had no further jurisdiction in such cases.

The Court (Grantham and Channell, JJ.) granted the prohibition. By the passing of the Act of 1892 the Crown had delegated to private companies certain powers, and it had given to the highway authorities increased powers of consenting to or forbidding proposed alterations in their streets than they formerly possessed, and the right to finally veto a proposed work now rested with the local authority. Referring to *Hull* v. *McFarlane* (2 C. B. N. S. 796), on the second question, whether the county court judge was an arbitrator, assuming he had jurisdiction, section 4 of the Act of 1878 referred the matter to him "as if he were an arbitrator," but that clearly did not make the county court judge an arbitrator, but only directed him how he should act.—Counsel, *Joseph Walton*, Q.C., *Macnorran*, Q C., and *Boxall*, for the corporation; *Cripps*, Q.C., and *Cassell*, for the company. Solicitors, *Sole, Turner, & Knight*, for *Cripps, Son, & Dash*, Tunbridge Wells; *W. E. L. Gaine*.

[Reported by Erskine Reid, Barrister-at-Law.]

BOOT'S CASH CHEMISTS (LANCASHIRE) (LIM.) *v.* GRUNDY AND OTHERS. Div. Court. 16th June.

Action, Cause of—Inducing Persons to Abstain from Trading—Combination—Malice.

This was a motion by the defendants to have the action dismissed on the ground that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action. The complaint of the plaintiffs was that the defendants, Messrs. Grundy, Palmer, & Co., and a large number of other firms who were members of the Printsellers Association, had combined together and issued a circular which had injured the plaintiffs in their business. The circular was as follows: "In view of the combination of several of the London publishers, it is time that all *bond fide* printsellers throughout the provinces became united to defend themselves. It is known that two or three firms have admitted that they supply Boots & Co., stores, drapers, and others (who are non-subscribers to the Printsellers Association) at half-price, and we think it very unfair when they know that these people want them to sell to the public at 25 per cent. off the published price, and advertise the fact. If the provincial trade will all agree not to order any goods from travellers representing houses whose publications are systematically shewn and offered by these notorious undersellers, then their reports of non-success would shew their principals how very seriously we take it; and although the measured proposal at the general meeting of the Printsellers Association will not go to the root of the evil, we feel sure it is bringing the aggressors into a smaller radius, and will to some extent mitigate the pernicious system of underselling. This matter is becoming so serious throughout the provinces that we venture to bring this suggestion before your notice, with the hope that by your assistance it will have the desired effect." For the defendants *Allen* v. *Flood*, 14 Times L. R. 125, was relied on, and it was submitted that the issue of this circular by a trade combination was not a conspiracy, and that even if the defendants, by means which were not unlawful, had induced others to do an act which was not unlawful but was injurious to the plaintiffs, no action would lie against them. *Cur. adv. vult.*

Phillimore, J., in delivering judgment, said the question was whether the combination by several against one for the purpose of depriving him of his trade, gave to the person so injured a cause of action. There were some injurious acts which one person might do another without himself committing a crime, and which, when done by several persons in combination might become criminal. In his view of the law, having regard to the fact that Lord Halsbury, L.C., Lord Ashbourne, and Lord Morris dissented from the view expressed by the majority of the House of Lords in *Allen* v. *Flood*, every combination to prevent a man carrying on his business and earning his livelihood were indictable conspiracies. Therefore, if the confederacy in this case, for the motives and purposes alleged in the statement of claim, were proved, it would be indictable, and at least equally, if not *a fortiori*, actionable. For these reasons he considered that the action should be allowed to go to trial.

Bigham, J. (whose judgment was read by Phillimore, J.), took a contrary view, being of opinion that no conspiracy could give rise to an action unless it violated, or threatened to violate, the rights of any individual as distinguished from the rights of the public at large. He could find in this case no acts alleged against the defendants which amounted to a violation of those rights, and he therefore came to the conclusion that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action. To allow such an action to go to trial would cause unnecessary expense and a waste of public time, and, being frivolous and vexatious, would be an abuse of the process of the court, and should be peremptorily stayed.

As their lordships differed Phillimore, J., being the junior judge, withdrew his judgment, and accordingly the action was ordered to be dismissed.—Counsel, *Rufus Isaacs*, Q C., and *Scrutton*; *Joseph Walton*, Q.C., and *H. A. Colefax*. Solicitors, *Lewis W. Taylor*; *Tyrrell Lewis, Lewis, & Broadbent*.

[Reported by Erskine Reid, Barrister-at-Law.]

MACKRELL AND ANOTHER v. THE JUSTICES OF BRENTFORD.
Div. Court. 12th June.

LICENSING — BEERHOUSE — PRIVILEGED HOUSE — RENEWAL OF LICENCE — REFUSAL OF — GROUNDS OF REFUSAL — WINE AND BEERHOUSE ACT, 1869 (32 & 33 VICT. c. 27), ss. 8 AND 19.

Case stated by the court of quarter sessions for the county of Middlesex. An appeal was heard on the 1st of July, 1899, against a refusal of the licensing justices for the Brentford Division to grant by way of renewal a beerhouse certificate in respect of the "Britannia Tap" beerhouse at Twickenham, to the appellant Shepherd, the occupier of the premises. On this appeal the appellants were Shepherd (the occupier) and Mackrell, the owner of the premises, and the respondents were the Brentford justices. The premises were premises in respect of which a beerhouse licence for the sale by retail of beer and cider, to be consumed on the premises, was in force on the 1st of May, 1869, and such licence had been (within the meaning of section 7 of the Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1870) continuously renewed in respect of the premises from time to time down to and including the year 1898, but notwithstanding such constant renewals no beer had been sold on the premises for at least twenty-eight years. No signboard was exhibited, nor was there any indication of a licence except that the words "Licensed, &c.," were printed over the door. The premises were thirty yards back from the high road in an enclosed yard, and there were no fittings on premises for the sale of beer. The licence had from 1895 been held by one Harbor, the then resident occupier, but no beer had been sold therein by Harbor, nor had any beer been sold by retail for many years before. He acted as manager for his employers and was not expected to trade there. Harbor sought to transfer his licence to Shepherd in January, 1899, at special transfer sesions, and the justices then for the first time became aware that the licensee, Harbor, had failed to exercise his rights as to the sale of beer on the premises, and they refused the transfer. Prior to and during the tenancy of Harbor the premises had been let to brewers at Twickenham for a term of 21 years, and the occupation by Harbor was as tenant to these brewers, for whom he acted as manager, and this beerhouse was for many years used only as a residence for the manager of these brewers and as a wholesale store for beer of the brewers. No information was ever given to the justices of these facts and the renewals were granted in ignorance of the fact that no trade was carried on. In 1898 the lease of the brewers expired, and the appellant Mackrell became by purchase the owner of the premises, and he in January, 1899, let the premises at £30 a year on a yearly tenancy to the appellant Shepherd, who entered into occupation of the premises and he was and still is the occupier. In January, 1899, an application for the transfer to Shepherd was refused on the authority of *Reg.* v. *Cotham* (46 W. R. 512; 1898, 1 Q. B. 802). At the general annual licensing meeting the appellant Shepherd applied for a renewal to himself as the resident holder and occupier of the premises of the certificate previously granted by the justices to and held by Harbor. Notice of objection to such renewal was given by the direction of the justices on the ground that no beer had been sold on the premises for many years and that the beerhouse was not required for the needs of the neighbourhood. No objection was made on any of the four grounds applicable, under section 8 of the Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869, to beerhouse licences granted prior to 1869. The application for the renewal was refused by the licensing justices (the respondents) and the appellants appealed to the quarter sessions. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the application being one for the renewal of the licence the appellant or his predecessor must be a person "keeping" an inn within the meaning of section 1 of the Alehouse Act, 1828, which Shepherd was not; that inasmuch as no beer had been sold on the premises by the previous occupier there was no jurisdiction under the Alehouse Act, 1828, or under the Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869, to grant to Shepherd a renewal of the certificate; that the previous renewal certificate purporting to be granted under section 1 of the Alehouse Act, 1828, at the annual licensing sessions in 1898, was a void and empty form, and in law could not be renewed in 1899; that there must be some actual keeping or user without which the licensing justices have no jurisdiction to exercise their powers under the Licensing Acts, and that the justices were bound by *Reg.* v. *Cotham* to refuse the renewal. On behalf of the appellants it was contended that the premises were a privileged beerhouse within the meaning of sections 8 and 19 of the Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869, and section 7 of the Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1870, and that a renewal of the certificate could only be lawfully refused upon one or more of the four grounds mentioned in section 8 of the Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869; and the appellants further contended that the case was distinguishable from *Reg.* v. *Cotham*, as in that case the application was for a transfer under section 4 of the Act of 1828, and not—as the present case was—for a renewal under section 1 of that Act. The justices found as a fact that no beer had been sold by retail, and that the successive licensees had not carried on, and had not intended to carry on, an inn on the premises, and that the licence was merely colourable; and on the authority of *Reg.* v. *Cotham*, which they held applied to the case, they refused to renew the licence. The question was whether the justices were right in so holding, or whether they were limited in refusing the renewal to the four grounds specified in section 8 of the Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869. The respondent justices did not appear.

THE COURT (GRANTHAM and CHANNELL, JJ.) allowed the appeal, and remitted the case to the justices with the intimation that they must grant the renewal. They held that as the beerhouse had been licensed continuously since 1869 the renewal of the licence could, by virtue of section 19 of the Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869, be refused only upon one of the four grounds specified in section 8 of that Act; that the grounds given—namely, that no beer had been sold therein, and that the house was not required for the needs of the neighbourhood—were not amongst those grounds, and were therefore not valid grounds for refusing the renewal, and that there being no objection on any one of the four grounds, the licence ought to be renewed, notwithstanding the fact that no beer had been sold on the premises for many years; and they distinguished the case of *Reg.* v. *Cotham*.—COUNSEL, *Bruce Williamson*. SOLICITORS, *C. Robinson & Co.*

[Reported by Sir SHERSTON BAKER, Bart., Barrister-at-Law.]

Solicitors' Cases.

Re **DEAKIN**. *Ex parte* **DANIELL**. C. A. No. 2. 15th June.

CHARGING ORDER IN FAVOUR OF SOLICITOR — APPLICATION TO DISCHARGE CHARGING ORDER — LIMIT OF TIME FOR APPLICATION TO DISCHARGE — JURISDICTION TO MAKE CHARGING ORDER — SOLICITORS ACT, 1860 (23 & 24 VICT. c. 127), s. 28 — BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883 (46 & 47 VICT. c. 52), s. 104.

This appeal from a decision of Wright, J., given on the 30th of May, 1900, raised an important question as to whether there was any jurisdiction in bankruptcy to make a charging order in favour of a solicitor under section 28 of the Solicitors Act, 1860. On the 9th of February, 1900, the Court of Appeal dismissed with costs a receiving order which had been made on the petition of two judgment creditors against the debtor, F. Deakin, on the previous 16th of January. The costs of the debtor were subsequently taxed at £43 3s. 5d.; and on the 23rd of March, 1900, G. H. Daniell, who had acted as solicitor for the debtor throughout the bankruptcy proceedings, applied for and obtained from Wright, J., sitting as a judge in bankruptcy, a charging order on the sum in question for his costs, charges, and expenses, under section 28 of the Solicitors Act, 1860. This charging order was served on the debtor on the 28th of March; and on the 26th of May notice was given him that an application for the enforcement of the order would be made to the judge in chambers on the 30th of May. On the 29th of May the debtor in response served on Daniell notice of an application to discharge the order in question. Both applications came on for hearing before Wright, J., on the 30th of May, when the learned judge refused the debtor's application to discharge, and made an order in favour of Daniell for payment of the sum secured by the charging order. From this decision the debtor now appealed; and it was urged on his behalf that the learned judge, in refusing to discharge the charging order under the power conferred on him by section 104 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, had felt himself bound by the time limit imposed on the exercise of that power by the decision in *Re May* (32 W. R. 839, 12 Q. B. D. 497). As a matter of fact, however, the order in question was not made, and could not, in fact, be made by the learned judge under the bankruptcy jurisdiction at all, but only under his jurisdiction as a judge of the High Court. This was the effect of the decision in *Re Suffield and Watts* (36 W. R. 584, 20 Q. B. D. 693), as was pointed out by Vaughan Williams, J., in *Re Wood, Ex parte Fanshawe* (1897, 1 Q. B. 314). That being so, section 104 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, and the cases decided on it, had no application to the point in question; the charging order, in fact, had nothing to do with the bankruptcy jurisdiction at all, but had been made under the jurisdiction of the High Court; and the learned judge was consequently free to discharge it within those time limits which were recognized as binding on the High Court in such cases—*i.e.*, at any time before the order had been acted on. Reference was also made by counsel for the appellant to *Guy* v. *Churchhill* (37 W. R. 504, 35 Ch. D. 489). The respondent, on the other hand, maintained that *Re Suffield and Watts* did not bear out the interpretation put upon it by Vaughan Williams, J., in *Re Wood*. Wright, J., in making the present charging order was clearly acting under the bankruptcy jurisdiction, and was accordingly bound by the time limit imposed on the exercise of the powers given by section 104 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, by the decision in *Re May*. Even, however, if he had made the order in his capacity of a judge of the High Court, he had since refused to discharge this order on the merits, and in the exercise of his discretion. Counsel for the respondent also referred to *Dalton* v. *Garrold* (33 W. R. 219, 14 Q. B. D. 543) and *Re Humphreys, Ex parte Roberts* (4 Manson 239).

THE COURT (Lord ALVERSTONE, M.R., RIGBY and COLLINS, L.JJ.) dismissed the appeal.

Lord ALVERSTONE, M.R.—Two points have been urged in favour of the appellant. As to the one point, it is suggested that Wright, J., acted in this case on some hard-and-fast rule as to there being some time limit. I doubt very much whether he so acted at all. I think that he acted generally, if I may be allowed the expression, on the ground that the application to discharge this charging order was on its merits made too late. As to the other point, the order was undoubtedly made by the learned judge when he was sitting as a judge alike of the High Court and in Bankruptcy. Now *Dallow* v. *Garrold* decides that any judge of the Divisional Court "before whom any such suit, matter, or proceeding has been heard or shall be depending," has jurisdiction to make a charging order under section 28 of the Solicitors Act, 1860—perhaps I may be allowed to add that had he not, the result would be rather serious. Now, were it not for what is said by Vaughan Williams, J., in *Re Wood*, I should also have thought that a judge in bankruptcy ought to have been able to make the same kind of order under the same section. I do not myself think, however, that that the point is really material here; for Wright, J., acted here in both capacities—as a judge of the High Court and as a judge in bankruptcy. I must not, however, be thought to endorse the opinion of Vaughan Williams, J., even if the point had been material. Then as to the substantial question of time, I think that

Wright, J., was justified in coming to the conclusion that under the circumstances he ought not to set the charging order aside merely in the exercise of his discretion.

Rigby, L.J.—I am of the same opinion. The difficulty in *Re Suffield and Watts* arose from the fact that the action was transferred from the Chancery Division to Cave, J., sitting as a judge in the Queen's Bench Division. For myself, however, I should hesitate to say, whether under or independently of authority, that a judge in bankruptcy could not exercise the power, if all the conditions be properly observed, of making a charging order in favour of a solicitor. But, at any rate, it is not necessary to decide the point now; for here it is clear that Wright, J., had both jurisdictions. As for the merits, it is, in my opinion, too late to bring them forward now.

Collins, L.J.—As to the opinion expressed by Vaughan Williams, J., in *Re Wood*, I do not think, as at present advised, that *Re Suffield and Watts* at all decided what the learned judge appears to have thought that it did. The point was not raised in that case at all.—Counsel, *Turrell; Herbert Reed*, Q.C., and *G. P. C. Lawrence*. Solicitors, *Morris & Rickards*; *G. Henry Daniell*.

[Reported by J. E. Morris, Barrister-at-Law.]

SOLICITOR ORDERED TO BE STRUCK OFF THE ROLL.

June 20.—Horace Melville Smith (77, Euston-road, London).

NEW ORDERS, &c.

TRANSFER OF ACTIONS.

Order of Court.

Saturday, the 16th day of June, 1900.

Whereas, from the present state of the business before Mr. Justice Stirling, Mr. Justice Byrne, Mr. Justice Cozens-Hardy, Mr. Justice Farwell, and Mr. Justice Buckley respectively, it is expedient that a portion of the causes assigned to Mr. Justice Stirling, Mr. Justice Byrne and Mr. Justice Cozens-Hardy, should for the purpose only of hearing or of trial be transferred to Mr. Justice Farwell and Mr. Justice Buckley; Now I, the Right Honourable Hardinge Stanley, Earl of Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, do hereby order that the several causes and matters set forth in the Schedules hereto, be accordingly transferred from the said Mr. Justice Stirling, Mr. Justice Byrne and Mr. Justice Cozens-Hardy, to Mr. Justice Farwell and Mr. Justice Buckley for the purpose only of hearing or of trial, and be marked in the Cause Books accordingly. And this order is to be drawn up by the Registrar, and set up in the several offices of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice.

FIRST SCHEDULE.

From Mr. Justice Stirling to Mr. Justice Farwell.

1900.

Ward v Halliley 1900 W 438 May 15
Webber v Battlebury 1900 W 402 May 26
Chapelhow v Collins 1900 C 702 May 30
The Johnston Die Press Co, ld v Waite & Saville, ld 1899 J 1,959 May 31
Cuff v Fontana 1900 C 881 June 5

SECOND SCHEDULE.

From Mr. Justice Byrne to Mr. Justice Buckley.

Sawrey v Woven Leather Machine Belting Co, ld 1899 S 183 April 12
Bishop v Davis 1900 B 1,209 May 16
Bowden v Watts 1899 B 960 May 17
Bowman, ld v Moore 1900 B 1,876 May 19
Silverlock v Hodgson 1900 S 170 May 21
Bowden Smith v Cartier 1900 B 760 May 21
Hill v Cooke 1899 H 3,571 May 24
Buckland v Buckland 1900 B 1,382 May 25
British Household Stores, ld v Hart Bangs v Hart 1900 B 1,239 May 26
A Cheverton & Co, ld v School Board for London 1899 A 933 May 28
Osborne v Ross 1899 O 1,871 May 30
Pearmund v Percy 1899 P 2,206 May 31
Pelham Clinton v Duke of Newcastle 1900 C 788 June 2
Real Estates Corpn of London, ld v Barshot 1900 R 290 June 7
Dods v Blyth Clarkson v Dods 1900 D 196 June 13

THIRD SCHEDULE.

From Mr. Justice Cozens-Hardy to Mr. Justice Farwell.

In re Allison's Patent, No 12,013 of 1887, and Patents, &c, Acts petn entered in Witness List March 17
In re Marshall & Naylor's Patent, No 25,128 of 1898, and Patents, &c, Acts petn entered in Witness List March 17
In re the Application of the Formalin Hygienic Co, ld for Registration of Trade-Mark, No 215,816 and Patents, &c, Acts motn entered in Witness List April 9
Haughton v Hyde 1899 H 4,069 May 5
Foakes v Miller 1899 F 457 May 5
In re Beeson Piddington v Beeson 1900 P 112 May 15
Attorney-General v Barker 1899 A 871 May 16
Allanson Winn v Lord Headley 1900 A 92 May 18
Slade v Provident Association of London ld 1899 S 1,704 May 18
Saqui & Lawrence v Jacobs 1900 S 225 May 19

Halsbury, C.

LAW SOCIETIES.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

Report of Special Committee.

At a general meeting of the society held on the 27th of April, 1900, the following resolution was passed—viz.: "That a committee be appointed to inquire into the best means of protecting the profession and the public against such malpractices as have have been disclosed in certain recent cases"; and Mr. H. E. Gribble, Mr. B. R. Heaton, Sir George H. Lewis, Mr. H. T. Norton, Mr. C. S. Pemberton, and the Hon. C. Russell were nominated by the society as members, it being arranged that the Council should nominate six of their body to act with them, and that the committee should have power to add to their number.

The Council nominated: Mr. J. S. Beale, Mr. J. Hollams, Mr. H. Manisty, Mr. R. Pennington, Mr. T. Rawle, and Sir A. K. Rollit. At the first meeting of the committee, held on the 8th of May, in the council room of the Society, Mr. Manisty was elected chairman, and in consequence of the fact that about 6,500 solicitors practise on London and 8,000 in the provinces, it was resolved *nem. con.* that the Associated Provincial Law Societies should be asked to nominate six members. This they did, and Mr. C. E. Barry, Bristol; Mr. M. T. Hodding, St. Albans; Mr. R. Pybus, Newcastle; Mr. T. H. Russell, Birmingham; Mr. C. L. Samson, Manchester; and Mr. W. A. Weightman, Liverpool, were added to the committee. The full committee thus formed met on the 15th of May, 1900. The committee report as follows:

Criminal Law.—The committee are of opinion that the criminal law with regard to misappropriation should be extended. At present the law is, that an agent intrusted with money or security for the payment of money, with any direction in writing to apply, pay, or deliver the money or security or the proceeds of the security to any person, or for any purpose specified in such direction, who in violation of good faith and contrary to the terms of such direction, converts the money or security to his own use or benefit, is guilty a misdemeanour. It will be observed that to constitute a criminal offence, misappropriation of money or security must not only be in violation of good faith, but contrary to the terms of a direction in writing. No doubt at the time of the passing of the Act (1861), this provision was considered necessary for the protection of the person charged, and much might still be said in favour of it. But experience shews that in cases of misappropriation it so frequently happens that a direction in writing cannot be proved (although the violation of good faith is clear) that on the whole it is not desirable that a direction in writing should be necessary to constitute a criminal offence. The offence should be complete if an agent deals with money or security contrary to his duty and in violation of good faith. The committee consequently recommend that the society should endeavour to obtain an amendment of the law to that effect.

Prosecutions in Criminal Cases.—A large proportion of the cases that come before the committee appointed by the Master of the Rolls under the Solicitors Act, 1888, to hear applications to strike solicitors off the Roll of Solicitors, are cases of alleged misappropriation of money or securities for money. If the criminal law be extended as the committee have suggested, many of these cases will be dealt with as criminal offences. This fact adds force to the question as to what action the society should take in cases where solicitors have apparently committed a criminal offence in fraudulently misappropriating moneys or securities. The question is a serious one and involves a consideration of the constitution of the society, and of its objects, its powers and its resources. A solicitor is, it must be remembered, an officer of the court. On his admission as a solicitor, he becomes subject to the rules and discipline of the court. On dishonourable conduct (whether criminal or otherwise) being proved against him, he is dismissed from his position by the court. Criminal proceedings have hitherto been left to the Crown or to the persons injured as in the case of wrongdoers not solicitors. The Incorporated Law Society, whose legal name is "The Society of Attorneys, Solicitors, Proctors, and others not being Barristers, practising in the Courts of Law and Equity of the United Kingdom," had its origin in a joint stock society, founded in 1825, by some solicitors, for the purpose of protecting their interests and representing their views as solicitors. In the year 1831, the members of the society obtained a Royal Charter granted to give encouragement to their undertaking. The undertaking is mentioned as one promoted by solicitors for the purpose of founding an institution for facilitating the acquisition of legal knowledge and for better and more conveniently discharging their professional duties, in consequence of which they had subscribed and paid considerable sums of money, and had purchased a piece of land within the Liberty of the Rolls, and had erected thereon a hall and library and other rooms, for the purposes of the institution. This charter was, however, surrendered in 1845, when the charter under which the society is now incorporated was granted, modifying the former constitution so that the members of the society should not possess any individual rights of property in its capital or possessions, rents or income, but that the whole capital and possessions, and the rents and income thereof, should be applicable to the general purposes of the society in promoting professional improvement and facilitating the acquisition of legal knowledge. The society has since, by statute, been appointed registrar of solicitors, and the body responsible for the examination of articled clerks prior to their admission as solicitors; and on the abolition of the Petty Bag Office some of the duties performed by that office were transferred to the society. Candidates for membership of the society must, of course, be solicitors. They must be proposed by a member of the society, and be balloted for. On being elected they pay an annual subscription, and can resign membership at any time. The society has no control over solicitors who are not

members, and has control over its own members, who number about one-half of the solicitors practising in England and Wales, only to the extent of excluding them from membership. Thus it will be seen, as was pointed out in a paper lately issued by the Council, that the society was in its inception entirely, and still is primarily, a voluntary association of solicitors for the exclusive benefit of its own members and supported by their subscriptions. The Council of the society must not be confounded with the committee appointed under the Solicitors Act, 1888, to hear complaints against solicitors with a view to their removal from the roll. That committee hears cases brought before it, as the masters of the courts formerly did, and it has done much good work at great expenditure of time and trouble, but the committee does not get up cases; in other words, it does not act as prosecutor, and if a case is proved before it, its duty ends when it has made its report. The Solicitors Act of 1888 contemplates an application to the committee, accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant stating the matters of fact on which he relies, and that the applicant should afterwards appear before the committee in person or by solicitor or counsel and prove his complaint. This is frequently done, but in other cases (and they are increasing in number) the applicant is either unable or unwilling to do more than place a statement (usually more or less confused) of his complaint before the society. In such cases it is the practice of the society to appoint a solicitor to investigate the case, and if from his report the circumstances seem to warrant it, they direct the solicitor to proceed with the case before the committee and present all the necessary evidence. In all cases in which the committee report adversely to the solicitor, the society place the case before the court, and apply to the court to strike the solicitor off the roll, or suspend him, as the court may direct. Until this year it has been the practice of the society to proceed with a complaint, even though it should appear that there is evidence of a criminal offence having been committed. But in February of this year Mr. Guillemard, of the Treasury, by direction of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, wrote to the President of the society as follows: "Would it not be desirable that there should be an understanding that when the society, in the course of their investigations of a case, find that there is *primâ facie* evidence of a criminal offence, they should at once report the facts to the Director of Public Prosecutions, so that he might, if he thought it advisable, take up the case? If, on such a prosecution, the accused were convicted, he would be struck off the roll as a matter of course. If he were acquitted of a criminal offence, but the circumstances, nevertheless, shewed serious professional misconduct, the application by the Law Society to strike him off the roll could proceed upon the materials already obtained. Under such an arrangement the Director of Public Prosecutions would have information at the earliest possible date, which would be in the interests of justice, and the Law Society might be spared considerable expense, with the result that they would have more money to spend upon other inquiries. Under existing arrangements, as Sir Michael understands them, the society do not usually communicate with the director, as suggested above, but complete the inquiry and proceed to apply to the court, leaving it for the judge, if he should think fit, to direct a criminal prosecution. This system seems on the face of it open to two objections: (1) There must always be a risk that if no communication is made to the director before the case is brought into court and a prosecution directed or suggested, the accused may abscond before the director is in a position to take action; (2) in the absence of communication between the director and the society, it may be that both parties are incurring expenditure in conducting inquiries into the same case. There may, of course, be objections to the course suggested which Sir Michael as a layman has overlooked, but it appears to him to be worth consideration, and he is encouraged by the readiness with which you have met his first request for information to hope that you will put him fully into possession of your opinion upon it." The committee have been informed that the opinion of the Council was fully in favour of the course suggested, and it was resolved that it should be adopted. In a late case (that of Arnold, Sismey, & Co.) it appears that the solicitor appointed by the society to investigate the case, in the course of his inquiries, placed himself in communication with the official receiver, who he found was perfectly willing to supply him with information, but was unable to do so without the sanction of the Director of Public Prosecutions, and the solicitor consequently applied to the latter on the subject, who wrote to the solicitor as follows: "The present position of the proceedings in this matter is that Mr. Sismey is remanded on a charge of conspiracy in one case. There are many other matters which have yet to be investigated by me which may, and probably will, result in further charges being preferred. I would venture to submit, for the consideration of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, that it would be rather inconvenient that the two inquiries should proceed at the same time, while, if the present proceedings result in conviction, the expense of the society's inquiry need not be incurred. Will you kindly let me know the views of the society? I need not say that in due course any information in my possession will be at their disposal." It will thus be seen what, at the present time, is the practice, and that the society is in close touch with the Public Prosecutor. But the action of the society has been with the object only of removing solicitors from the roll. It has not instituted criminal proceedings against solicitors, and clearly there is no legal obligation upon it to do so. The committee, however, feel that, for the protection of the profession and the public, the punishment of solicitors guilty of misappropriation of money or property should be ensured. They believe that the members of the society share this feeling, and they recommend that the society do everything in their power, whether in support of the Public Prosecutor or a private complainant, or independently of either, to secure that this shall be done. They consequently suggest that the provincial law societies and all members of the profession should be requested to bring to the notice of the Council all cases in which it shall be responsibly alleged that a solicitor has misappropriated moneys or securities entrusted to him as a solicitor or trustee, that the Council if satisfied that the case is a proper one, shall take or authorize such action as may be necessary or expedient to secure the immediate and effective prosecution of the offender, either by communicating with the Public Prosecutor or by assisting the aggrieved party at the expense of the society, or by the society itself prosecuting at its own expense, as in the opinion of the Council the necessities of the case may require. If it should be found that the constitution of the society does not justify the application of its funds to these purposes, the committee recommend that steps should be taken to obtain the necessary powers. But the resources of the society may be found inadequate to the necessary expenditure. It is, however, to be remembered that if the criminal law be extended as suggested, many of the cases now heard by the committee appointed by the Master of the Rolls, under the Act of 1888, will be criminal offences and will come before the criminal courts instead of the committee, thus reducing the expenditure in respect of which £2,500 per annum is at present granted by Government. The Government would probably allow the amount not required for the expenditure under the Act of 1888 to be used for these new duties; and should further funds become necessary, the committee suggest that application should be made by the society to Government for a larger grant. Solicitors and those qualifying to be solicitors pay to the Government in duties and fees upwards of £180,000 per annum, and therein our profession differs from others. This fact, in the opinion of the committee, entitles solicitors to exceptional consideration in an application for a grant of money if necessary for an object which must commend itself to the Government.

Bankruptcy.—The Solicitors Act of 1843 provides that the Commissioners of Stamps shall not issue a stamped certificate to any person authorizing him to practise as a solicitor, until he shall produce a certificate from the registrar of solicitors (*i.e.*, the society) that he is a solicitor, and entitled to take out a stamped certificate. The Solicitors Act of 1888 provides that if a solicitor who has obtained a certificate entitling him to practice, neglects for twelve months after it expires, to take out a fresh certificate, it shall be in the discretion of the registrar of solicitors to grant or refuse an application for a fresh certificate subject to an appeal to the Master of the Rolls. Since that Act was passed, the society have in all cases in which a solicitor has brought himself within the discretion of the registrar, and it has appeared that he is an undischarged bankrupt, refused a fresh certificate, but until last year it was supposed that if a solicitor had not allowed his certificate to expire, but in ordinary course applied for a renewal, the registrar had no discretion, because the Solicitors Act of 1843, which regulates the matter, is in terms mandatory, that upon the filing of a declaration containing particulars as to name, address, &c., the registrar shall issue his certificate unless he shall have reason to believe that the applicant is not on the roll. It was, however, decided last year by the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench that the registrar has the same discretion in these cases as was specifically declared in the Act of 1888 with regard to cases in which the certificate had lapsed. It is consequently now the practice to refuse certificates to all persons known to be bankrupts, and to leave them to their right of appeal to the Master of the Rolls or the court. The committee approve of this practice and consider that it should be extended to all cases of registered deeds of arrangement or assignment for the benefit of creditors. The committee understand that the society are having an independent search made to ascertain, before the next renewal of certificates, the name of every solicitor to whom this practice will apply.

Accounts.—It is, of course, merely a truism to say that in every well-conducted business proper accounts should be kept, and yet the committee have reason to believe that amongst some solicitors there is considerable laxity and carelessness in this respect. It is equally a truism to say that no accounts, however perfect, are a protection against designed dishonesty; but proper accounts regularly and carefully kept, and periodically made up and audited, and a balance-sheet prepared, are some safeguard both to the solicitor himself and his clients. Carelessness in this respect, without any intention of dishonesty produces confusion, which, under certain circumstances, may drift into dishonesty. Trust accounts can, with few exceptions, always be kept at a bank in the name of the trustees, and whenever possible this should be done. It enables a solicitor to relieve himself from the responsibility of holding the money or securities belonging to the trust. In all trusts of any magnitude or complexity it is very desirable that the accounts should be periodically audited, and to guard against any danger of the expense of such audit falling upon the trustees it is desirable that provisions should be introduced into wills and settlements, authorizing trustees to have such audit made at the expense of the estate. It is not necessary, nor is it good practice that solicitors should (except perhaps in some very rare cases) hold money belonging to their clients for any lengthened period. It should be paid to the clients' banking account or deposited in his name. It is important for solicitors to remember that they are not bankers and ought not to make use of their clients' money in their hands. Where accounts are properly and carefully kept, the books speak for themselves, and there is no absolute necessity for any separate banking account to secure this, but many solicitors do keep a banking account separate from their own, and identified as a trust account, to which they place all moneys in their hands belonging to their clients, and in the opinion of the committee it is very desirable that, as far as possible, this course should be adopted in addition to the careful keeping of accounts. It may be said that with a dishonest man this course will not prevent misappropriation, and the observation is true, but it is a protection against himself to a man, who may be careless, but does not intend to be fraudulent.

Insurance or Guarantee.—Various suggestions towards this end have been

submitted to the committee, and considered by them, but nothing of general practicability has been proposed. Some of the committee are opposed to the principle involved; others, however, while they feel the matter is one of great complexity and difficulty, trust that some scheme may ultimately be devised and worked out.

On behalf of the committee,

(Signed) H. MANISTY, Chairman.

SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION.

ANNUAL FESTIVAL.

The 40th annual festival of the Solicitors' Benevolent Association was held on Tuesday at the Hotel Metropole, Mr. HY. ATTLEE taking the chair. Among the guests were the Hon. Mr. Justice Stirling, Messrs. F. W. Hollams, Mr. J. S. Udal (Attorney-General, Fiji), H. Manisty (President of the Incorporated Law Society), G. Crombie (President of the Yorkshire Law Society), W. Townend (President of the Wakefield Law Society), M. T. Hodding (President of the Herts Law Society), R. B. Attlee, A. H. Bentley, E. K. Blyth, G. Booth, G. Holme Bower, B. Browne, E. J. Bristow, E. L. Burgin, J. F. Burton, M. H. Cotton, L. F. Cotton, H. Morten Cotton, J. A. Collins, Sir H. H. Crawford, Messrs. G. S. Cowie, W. C. Cripps (Tunbridge Wells), Grantham R. Dodd, Walter Dowson, Thomas England, W. Fremlin, W. H. Gray, J. Roger B. Gregory, A. E Green, H. E. Gribble, P. Hardy, Samuel Harris (Leicester), F. W. Harris, B. F. Hawksley, A. Helder, M.P. (Whitehaven), R. G. F. Hills, C. R. Hills, W. G. King, Harry R. Lewis, H. G. Lousada, J. Spencer Lovell, R. J. A. Lumby, A. S. Mather, A. Neilson, F. P. Morrell (Oxford), F. R M. Phillips, W. B. Peat, R. Pennington, J.P., E. T. Penlington, T. J. Pitfield, H. N. Remnant, J. E. W. Rider, Arthur E. Savill, Harry Savill, T. Skewes-Cox, M.P. (Richmond), John Stephenson, J. E. Stephenson, Frank W. Stone (Tunbridge Wells), Maurice A. Tweedie, R. W. Tweedie, J. Turner, Henry Tyrrell, H. R. Tyrrell, A. W. Wells, R. J. White (London), A. Wills.

The CHAIRMAN gave the health of the Queen, observing that on the morrow the Queen entered upon another year of her long and glorious reign.

The toast having been duly honoured, he proposed the health of "The Prince of Wales, the Princess of Wales, and other Members of the Royal Family," after which

The CHAIRMAN gave the toast of the evening, "The Solicitors' Benevolent Association, and may prosperity continue to attend it." He observed that one characteristic he had noticed in his countrymen seemed to him peculiarly English, and that was that if he heard any tale of distress which moved him to sympathy and seemed to call for a remedy, he did not at once dismiss it from his mind as something too painful to dwell upon, but, on the contrary, he took it home with him, enlisted the sympathy of his family and his friends, and shortly had inaugurated a dinner, to which he asked everybody with whom he had influence or with whom even he had the most casual influence. He did this with the most remarkable energy, and the dinner usually became an annual function, the objects for which it was intended were attained, and the necessary fund to accomplish the end in view would be established. Such, in a few words, was the history of the Solicitors' Benevolent Association. Touched by the tale of distress which was given to them of the condition of some of their country brethren who were at that time in a peculiarly unfortunate position owing to local causes, they determined they would form a society so that there might be the means on the part of the whole profession of rendering that duty which the profession as a whole owed to the less fortunate members. And he could not help thinking that it was with some reference to the trait of character he had observed that they thought it was not merely sufficient there should be one annual general meeting, but that there should also be a festival such as this at which the claims of those less fortunate ones should be laid before the profession. Accordingly, this festival had been held from the very commencement of the society, and great had been its success. He thought the solicitor branch of the profession was much indebted to the shrewdness of those six gentlemen who met at Liverpool on the occasion to which he had referred, whose names were scarcely known, but who had decided that there should be at least once a year a meeting of the profession at which there could be brought forward, as upon the present occasion, the claims of their comrades who had fallen out of the ranks or who had failed to attain that measure of success which he hoped belonged to those who were present. And in order that he might encourage them in some measure to like exertions, he would point out how much good had resulted from the efforts of those six gentlemen. Since the formation of the society in 1853 no less a sum than £93,000 had been expended in relieving the wants and necessities of those members of the profession who had unfortunately not been successful or in providing for the wives and children of those whom death had cut off before they were able to make provision for them. That was a large sum. In addition to that a considerable amount had been placed on one side and invested so that the relief which the society afforded should be a permanent relief. And it had been the object and aim of the society that no member of the profession stricken by misfortune should ever apply to the society without receiving relief. He thought he was right in saying that the directors had not allowed a single application from anyone who was really deserving to pass without some adequate relief. But the relief at present rendered was not altogether adequate. Great efforts had been made to establish some system of permanent relief for the widows and children. He might refer to the magnificent donations which Mr. Hollams had made. Mr. Hollams rightly appreciated what was wanting; he understood that there was real distress amongst deserving solicitors, and his example was one which touched them all, and must make them feel satisfied, and Mr. Hollams was assured that great necessity existed when he made the excellent and liberal provision by which he had established two or three annuities permanently. There was real cause for the exercise of benevolence. He did not like to single out Mr. Hollams alone without also reminding them that the profession at the festival in the Diamond Jubilee year, under the careful guidance of another eminent solicitor, Mr. Addison, succeeded in putting aside the sum of upwards of £8,000, which had also been invested for the payment of annuities. He thought that if the six gentlemen who established the society were now alive they would say that the results had far exceeded their expectations. But in their day the number of practising solicitors was only 6,000 or 7,000 at most. Now there were at least 15,000 solicitors actually in practice, and whose names appeared in the Law List. He was astonished to find, on making inquiries some few years ago with regard to the average income of solicitors, that it could not be put higher than about £300 a year, in fact a much lower sum was thought to represent the average income. It was difficult to realize quite what that meant. But to those who lived in London, where there was a rich harvest field, it was difficult to understand how so small an amount could be the income of active members of the profession. It seemed to him altogether an inadequate income for men who had passed at least some five years of their lives without earning anything, and who had also had to pay very heavy fees in order to enter the profession. It seemed to him a very inadequate, poor result. But he wanted them to realize that if that truthfully represented the average income of solicitors, what a large number there must be who could not make any provision for those who were dependent upon them. And when they considered the chances of life, how many there must be who must in the battle of life in the profession fall out and fail, of the measure of success which was necessary to ensure to them in old age, when no man could work—at all events in the solicitor profession—adequately and properly, how many there must be who could not make that sort of provision. Therefore there was a very large number who had claims upon the rest of the profession, and he thought that no society could better supply the needs of these unfortunate ones than the Solicitors' Benevolent Association. He did not like on such an occasion as the present to make use of any language which could be thought in any way to be exaggerated, but he ventured to put it to them that they were guilty of something like cruelty to those who were dependent upon their poorer brethren if they failed to assist them out of their abundance. He did appeal to them to make a strong effort to enable the directors they had placed over the society to adequately deal with the painful cases which came before them. He knew from personal experience of cases how carefully the claims which were made upon the society were scrutinized. He was satisfied that it was to the deserving that the small amounts which the directors had to disburse were applied, and he thought the profession owed to the directors a duty to see that at least they placed them in a position where they could meet the claims which came before them, and which they had elected them to deal with. If he could but once arouse in them a sense of the distress with which the directors had to deal he felt certain the impulse would not be wanting to relieve it. And when once they felt that impulse they would determine that as far as in them lay the society should not in the future remain in the unsatisfactory position of its income being inadequate to meet the real claims upon it. Those present were all members of the profession, and were able to judge of the needs of many of its members. There must be some among those present who sometimes cast their minds back to the days when they were students, and who could remember those who started with them with expectations as well justified as theirs, and with hopes not less keen. How many had kept abreast with them? Did they ever turn back and consider them? He did not envy the man who could forget his early days and those who started with him in the struggle of life as school or college friends or as fellow students. Let them remember also that the battle was not always to the strong or the race to the swift. They had seen what six men had done in the founding of the association. Everyone present had some sphere of influence in which they could press the cause of this excellent society in lightening the cares and gladdening the hearts of those who were in distress. He knew of no pleasure comparable to that with which one realized that some slight effort of his has succeeded in making a home more happy, a life more charming.

The toast having been honoured with enthusiasm,

The SECRETARY (Mr. J. T. Scott) announced subscriptions and donations amounting to £1,124, amongst which were the following: The Chairman, £105; Mr. R. W. Tweedie (chairman of the board of directors), £105; Sir G. H. Lewis, £100; Mr. John Hollams, £50; Mr. John Hunter, £21; Mr. J. A. Druce, £21; Mr. H. Manisty, £10 10s.; Kent Law Society (balance of funds subscribed towards expenses of visit of the Incorporated Law Society to Dover, October, 1899), £54 8s. 2d.

Mr. WALTER DOWSON gave the toast "The Bench and the Bar." He observed that there was no body of persons for whom we had greater regard than the bench and the bar. It would be a truism to say that the bench were perfectly immaculate—that was to say, not that the decisions of each individual member of the bench were always right, or that they were always thought to be right by the courts which overruled them, but as regarded their general policy, and as regarded their standing in the world at large, they were absolutely immaculate. In some other countries they were suspicious with regard to the bench, and the reasons as to why they gave their judgments; but there were no suspicions in the minds of anybody in this country as to the ground on which English judges gave their judgments. To the best of their ability they gave them honestly and openly, and the judgment was always that which at the moment they thought fair and equitable, and that was one of the things of which we were most justly proud that we did

enjoy in this country a bench whose decisions we knew were pronounced to the best of their ability and according to what they thought right and just. The bar stood equally high. They were the future judges—not all of them perhaps, but every member of the bar had probably that ambition before him. There were those who had sometimes thought that solicitors and barristers would be better as one profession — that was to say, on an equal footing. But he thought there was a very definite advantage in the present condition of things. Those who carried on day by day the active profession of the solicitor knew the great advantage of having the assistance of the bar. They knew the value of being fortified with counsel's opinion if they wanted to keep themselves right. But altogether apart from that consideration they knew the great use the counsel's opinion was to them. They knew as solicitors how desirable it was to have someone else they could go to, and that the counsel they consulted might look at a difficult question from a different point of view, and they would get an individual opinion and an honest opinion. Although the bench and the bar were not, of course, immediately associated with the society, he had no doubt they had great sympathy with it. One of the great obects of the society was to induce every solicitor to join it. And, looked at merely from the point of view of insurance, it was an advantage to become a member, because in that case anyone requiring assistance would be considered much more liberally—and the same remark would apply to his widow or children—than if he had not been a member. It was an honour to the society that it did not confine its efforts to members of the society—that was to say, it spent very considerable sums of money in annual donations to members of the profession who were not members of the society. But the directors looked rather more liberally at the claims of members, their widows and families, than they did at those of outsiders. Therefore merely from the point of view of insurance he might ask solicitors to assist the funds, and he would urge that merely from the selfish point of view they should become members. At the last meeting of the board a case came before them where the widow of a member had received during a series of years so large a sum as £900, and on this occasion she was granted another £50 Looked at merely from the point of view of insurance this was a very large sum of money to receive because the member had paid—let it be supposed—twenty annual subscriptions of a guinea, and the widow was justly able to come upon the society for annual donations amounting in the aggregate to £950. He did not think that any insurance society could give more favourable returns.

Mr. Justice Stirling responded for the bench. He said that no member of the bench stood by himself. He could not forget that he was a member of a very illustrious body at the present, who followed a very illustrious line of predecessors, and he hoped and believed that a no less illustrious body of successors would follow him. It was almost exactly forty years ago since he first became acquainted with Lincoln's-inn. At that time the great Lord Campbell was Lord Chancellor, Sir Richard Bethell Attorney-General, Lord Justice Knight-Bruce and Lord Justice Turner discharged the duties of the Court of Appeal in Chancery, Sir John Romilly, as he then was, was Master of the Rolls, and there were Vice-Chancellor Kindersley, Vice-Chancellor Stuart, and Vice-Chancellor Page Wood. At the bar, besides the Attorney-General he had mentioned, there were Roundell Palmer and Selwyn. Before Vice-Chancellor Page Wood there was an even greater galaxy—Cairns, and Giffard, and James, and Amphlett, all of whom afterwards became judges. He had seen all these men pass away. He had seen them succeeded by men no less eminent who at that time had not achieved even a reputation. For example, Sir George Jessel at that date had scarcely shewn the signs of the greatness which he afterwards achieved. And to call to remembrance a few names who had since adorned the bench—such, for example, as a man whose loss they all lamented, the late Lord Justice Chitty — made the responsibility of a judge, and of one who had to respond for the judges, very great. It was his misfortune—the misfortune of the public too—that he had recently become the senior judge of the Chancery Division. He had now served on the bench for fourteen years and a little more, and he felt himself getting an old man—old, he thought, compared with some of their friends at the bar. But he was bound to say that the bar displayed great vitality amongst its members, for the two learned barristers from whom he learned his law, his old masters, were still in the active exercise of their profession at the present day, although they were much older, he need not say, than himself, and yet they held distinguished positions in the conveyancing branch of the profession, and they still discharged with efficiency their duties. He hoped, therefore, that though he felt himself getting old—he might not be too old—at all events that he might be able with some degree of efficiency to discharge for a few months more the duties of his office, by which time he should have achieved the period of the magical fifteen years which entitled a judge to relief and the public to be delivered from him. The tribute they had been pleased to pay to the bench was well deserved. He would say, and he did not think he was disclosing professional secrets, that his respect for the bench since he had known it more intimately and seen it, so to speak, from behind the stage had greatly increased. The men who when they were addressed from the benches where the bar placed themselves in the courts of justice seemed stern and sometimes not too sympathetic, he knew now from intimate acquaintance with them applied themselves most intensely to the discharge of their duties and conscientiously bestowed upon the cases brought before them an amount of care and thoughtfulness which in his ignorant days he should never have attributed to them. He desired, in a few words, to express his sympathy with the Solicitors' Benevolent Association, first of all as members of the same profession to whose assistance every judge and every barrister owed a great deal in the administration of justice. Nothing made the administration of justice easier or more pleasant than to find the solicitor was discharging his duty well, and had so instructed his counsel that they were enabled to place before the judge a clear and well-considered statement of the facts. To all of them the judges owed a great deal in this respect. But it was more particularly in connection with the society he wished to say a word. He congratulated them on the prosperity of the society. It was a great matter that the income received by the society as a result of the appeal made to fellow-members should have reached the large sum which had been mentioned, but it was comparatively easy—not to say altogether, but comparatively easy—in these days to collect large sums of money for charitable purposes. They had this winter and spring seen appeals made to the public for large sums and responded to. He did not remember in recent times any period when the appeals had come more frequently or had had so much to commend them to the public. Take, for example, the three calamities which had fallen upon us within the last twelve months—the war, the famine in India, and the fire in Ottawa, all of which had led to appeals to the public, which had been generously responded to. But there rested the still greater difficulty after the funds had been obtained of administering them successfully; and he congratulated the members that they had amongst them men who devoted themselves to that most difficult task of seeing that the funds were properly applied. Anyone who had had anything to do with the administration of charity knew the very great difficulty there was in preventing the funds which were placed at the disposal of charitable individuals from being misapplied and from doing more mischief than if they were let alone. There was nothing, he believed, more difficult than to successfully administer a charity. From what he could gather, the society was fortunate indeed in having men who would apply themselves to this most difficult subject, and who discharged their duties to the entire satisfaction of the subscribers, and to the great benefit of those who were intended to be reached by this benevolent society. He wished the association the utmost success.

Mr. F. W. Hollams replied for the bar. He referred to the good feeling which always existed between the two branches of the profession. A thorny subject had been touched upon by Mr. Dowson in proposing the toast—the union of the two branches of the profession. In his opinion it was sufficient that the two branches existed as at present, and there was no wide gulf which in any way detracted from the alliance between them. They each performed their own part, and he hoped performed it successfully.

Mr. F. W. Stone (Tunbridge Wells) gave the toast "The Incorporated Law Society." He said he had been told that the society was on its trial. It had been on its trial for so many years that they were quite sure it would come safely through it. He was one of those who thought that the society deserved the thanks of the whole profession. He was sorry that more of the solicitor branch of the profession did not belong to it. He believed that the greater the number of its members and the more representative it became, the better it would be able to do its duty. That they were serious duties would not be doubted. They knew the society's grave responsibilities, and they believed the Council did their work as the Discipline Committee thoroughly, honestly, and well, and he voiced the profession in saying that he hoped it would never be turned into a simple prosecuting society for proceeding against those members who unfortunately brought the profession into disrepute. He believed there was no higher body of men, none more faithful, none more just, none more high-minded, than the solicitors. He asserted that the profession as a body contained very few black sheep. The solicitors lived in the glaring light of criticism. They knew that every letter they wrote was liable to be read in open court, and that almost every word they uttered might be turned into an undertaking, and how seldom were they found at fault? To whom did they owe a debt of gratitude for looking after their interests but to the Incorporated Law Society? The provincial societies did good work in each county. Everyone should join the society, even the black sheep, for then they could be kept in order. They should all do their utmost to bring every member of the profession up to a high position by getting him to join the society.

Mr. Hy. Manisty (President of the Incorporated Law Society) returned thanks for the society. He remarked upon the large amount of work the President of the Incorporated Law Society was called upon to get through, and said that if he had known this time last year how great it was he should have very much hesitated in accepting the position. The year had been one of hard work, and it had been a year also of one or two distressing incidents. He said one or two, or perhaps three, and he would emphasise that because it was but one or two or three. He felt that what Mr. Stone had said was absolutely true, and that the solicitors, as a body of men, had imposed upon them the confidence of numerous clients, and that with the rarest exception, considering the number, was that confidence misplaced. There were two things connected with the Incorporated Law Society which they would do well to dwell upon. One of these was that he believed there might be no fear of want of severity in dealing with themselves, the danger would be perhaps the other way. He would say a word in a moment with regard to that, but they had not sufficient power as a society to deal with the members of the profession. If every member of the profession was necessarily a member of the Incorporated Law Society—or let it be called what it might, he did not care for the name of the society especially—they would have this power. But if there was a determination amongst themselves to ostracize the man who misbehaved himself—he did not mean to the extent absolutely of rendering himself liable to the criminal law, but to the extent of doing things which they considered as a body of gentlemen ought not to be done by one of themselves, doing things which they considered were discreditable to any man occupying the position of a solicitor—if they had power they could then do a great deal. But the society had not the power.

Every member of the profession joined the society or not as he pleased, and if a member of the society did anything short of that which would enable the society to present him to the court for conduct which would cause him to be struck off the roll, he could say, "I snap my fingers at you. I will retire from your body." That ought not to be. If the Council had power to say to a man, "If you do this, or if you do not do that, you shall cease to be a member of our body," and if a man should be ostracized, if he no longer held up his head as a member of the society, there would not be scandals such as had been. It was the first step that led to them. If that first step could be stopped, if the Council had that absolute power, they might depend upon it things would be in a different position. Another thing was that while the Council had the power of excluding members from the society they were not sufficiently backed by the members of the profession joining the society. Every solicitor throughout the land ought to join the Incorporated Law Society, so that it might become an organization with power to speak for the whole body of the profession, and if only that prevailed throughout the country it would very soon bring about that which he had spoken of—that a solicitor would be ostracized unless he belonged to it. These were the things which were required. He had said before that the only danger would be that the Council would be too severe upon the members of the profession. But though that might be their opinion it might be the opinion or others that the Council would not be severe enough. He should be most sorry to see anything which would prevent an appeal to the court and dealing by the court with the decision of the Council. They were all, and they ought never to forget it, officers of the court, and they had a right to look to the court for protection, The court ought to be in the position of punishing offenders against the laws of right and wrong as their superior officers. They ought always to be liable to be brought before the court as an officer was brought before a court-martial. There should always be the right to go to the court to determine what was to be done. And that being so with regard to what was called professional misconduct, he would like to say a word with regard to criminal prosecutions. He agreed with Mr. Stone in what he had said whith regard to this. He hoped it would not be necessary that the Council should prosecute. He believed that the Public Prosecutor would be quite prepared to take up any case they brought before him. He hoped the Council would be, as they had always been in the past, anxious to put before him any case that might arise, but he did think that when so much had been said about the society as had been said during the last few months, they ought to declare to the world that if it should so happen that the Public Prosecutor would not take up a case, the Council should step in. They would not see solicitors misbehave themselves, and allow it to be said there were no means by which they should be brought to justice. He believed the Public Prosecutor would always act, but let it be said that if he would not the Council would be prepared to do so. He believed the Incorporated Law Society was a necessity to the solicitor branch of the profession, as was any organization to every profession which would enable it to speak with one voice, and he hoped and believed that in a few years the President of the Incorporated Law Society would be able to speak with much greater power than he could speak on behalf of the profession.

Mr. GEORGE CROMBIE (President of the Yorkshire Law Society) responded on behalf of the provincial law societies. He said the Yorkshire Law Society was a very old society, going back to 1786, and it had 120 members, which, for a country society, was a very considerable representation of the profession, especially having regard to the fact that there were in Yorkshire a number of other legal societies with a large number of members. He had sometimes heard it said that these local societies were antagonistic to the Incorporated Law Society. He repudiated that at once — so far, at least, as the societies with which he had been concerned, and he had had considerable experience of the local societies, which always tried to act in unison with the Incorporated Law Society. They did their best to protect the interests of the profession locally, and when they found any difficulty they went to the Incorporated Law Society for that assistance which was invariably given to them, and given most ungrudgingly in all cases. There was only one thing he wished to remark upon. He did think it would be wise that they should be brought more into contact with the Incorporated Law Society as bodies. It was true there was the annual meeting, but on these occasions the addresses and the papers and the speeches occupied all attention, and there was no possibility of that union of thought and ideas which he would like to see. He had often thought it would be wise if it were possible for a deputation to be formed from each local law society to express to the Incorporated Law Society, at a meeting to be held in London, their views on matters which were pending in which the interests of the profession were concerned. He was quite certain that if a day could be appointed for such a meeting it would result in great benefit to the profession, and would place the Incorporated Law Society in unison with the different societies throughout the country, and give it some idea of what the views of those societies were and would enable it, however efficiently it does its duty, to do it still more efficiently. He trusted that the time would come when such an arrangement would be effected. He thought it would result in general benefit, not only to the Incorporated Law Society, but to the societies in the country. In concluding he referred to a case where the Solicitors' Benevolent Association had dealt most liberally with the widow of a solicitor who had not been a member of the association; but the case was brought forward through the Yorkshire society.

Mr. R. TWEEDIE (Chairman of the Board of Directors), in proposing the health of the chairman, said the board would have very much greater difficulty in administering the funds were it not for the assistance given by their very able secretary, Mr. Scott.

The CHAIRMAN returned thanks, and the proceedings terminated.

A selection of music under the direction of Mr. Alfred James was given during dessert by the following artistes: Madame Clara Samuell, Mr. Walter Coward, Mr. Albert James, Mr. Edward Dalzell, and Mr. Robert Hilton. At the pianoforte, Mr. Fountain Meen.

LEGAL NEWS.

OBITUARY.

The death is announced of Mr. JOHN SHAW, solicitor, of Beddington Lodge, near Croydon, Surrey, on the 19th inst., in his ninety-fifth year. Mr. Shaw was born in September, 1805, just before the Battle of Trafalgar. Although, owing to his advanced age, he had not for some years taken any active part in professional work, he was at the date of his death a member of the firm of Baileys, Shaw, & Gillett, of Berners-street, solicitors, and may rightly be termed the father of the profession, having been admitted in Hilary Term, 1831. Mr. Shaw's father, who was a solicitor practising in Old Burlington-street, died in 1825, and Mr. Shaw was subsequently articled to the late Mr. William Cory, of Harley-street. After his admission, in 1831, Mr. Shaw practised for a short time in offices in Cork-street, and in 1836 he joined the late Mr. Edward Savage Bailey and Mr. Michael Smith, the predecessors of the present firm. Mr. Shaw, in 1841, married Dorothy, the daughter of Mr. Thomas Hardcastle, of Bolton, Lancashire. Mrs. Shaw died in 1882, and there were no children of the marriage. By his sound judgment, tact, and high integrity during an exceptionally long life, Mr. Shaw had secured the respect and confidence of all who met him in business, and had endeared himself to a large circle of personal friends. He was well known in the hunting world, and hunted until he was well past eighty years of age, and as a horseman and judge of a horse had few equals.

GENERAL.

Her Majesty's judges held their annual whitebait dinner at the Ship Hotel, Greenwich, on Monday.

The election of chairman, vice-chairman, and other officers of the General Council of the Bar will take place on Monday next, the 25th inst.

The Land Registry (New Buildings) Bill, on the 18th inst., passed through Committee without amendment, and was read a third time in the House of Commons.

Mr. Arthur Cohen, Q.C., will preside at the complimentary dinner which is to be given by the South-Eastern Circuit to the Master of the Rolls and Sir R. Finlay, Q.C., on Saturday.

In the *London Gazette* of the 15th inst. the official announcement is made of Sir Richard Webster's title as Baron Alverstone of Alverstone, in the Isle of Wight; and on Monday Lord Alverstone was introduced in the House of Lords by Lord James of Hereford and Lord Macnaghten with the usual formalities, and took the oath and signed the roll.

According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in the case of *Knoxville Traction Co.* v. *Lane*, says the *Central Law Journal*, injuries to the feelings and sensibilities of a woman of good reputation while a passenger on a street car, caused by insulting and indecent language used to and about her by one of the employees in charge of the car, renders the carrier liable for damages, and this irrespective of any negligence in employing the servant, or of any authorization or ratification of his act.

According to the *Westminster Gazette*, Mr. Justice Grantham, on Thursday last, in suspending a solicitor for two years for obtaining 15*s.* by concealing the fact that he had not had a document stamped, remarked he could not help feeling that the judges were placed in a very humiliating position when called upon, as they were to-day, to strike off the rolls a solicitor who had stolen less than a sovereign, while everyone knew that there were leading solicitors who had stolen half a million sterling who were not proceeded against.

After Mr. Balfour's statement in the House of Commons on Monday, says the Parliamentary correspondent of the *Times*, that, if desired, he would give an assurance that no controversial business other than that which was already before the House or had been introduced in the House of Lords would be proceeded with this session, it may be taken for granted that the Bill outlined by Mr. Chamberlain in introducing the Australian Commonwealth Bill on the 14th ult. for appointing colonial and Indian representatives to be members of the Privy Council and Lords of Appeal will not be persevered with.

In responding to the toast of "The Judges," at the Mansion House dinner on Wednesday, the Master of the Rolls said that the cordial reception which had been accorded to him—gracious as it was—was necessarily anticipatory, as he had still to win his spurs. The task of the judge was difficult in steering a mid course between the cross-examining spirit which incessantly interrupted counsel and the absolute silence which refrained even from asking a question which might serve to elucidate a difficulty. The judges of this realm had acquired their character of absolute and incorruptible integrity through centuries of history, and he hoped and believed that her Majesty's present judges were not unworthy of these great traditions.

On Saturday in last week Mr. Justice Bruce, as chairman of a meeting of the Prison Mission and Discharged Female Prisoners' Aid Society, pointed out that during the past year no fewer than 247 women had been received from various prisons and had had an opportunity given them of earning an honest livelihood by free labour. He ventured to think that was one of the most successful ways of dealing with the criminal class.

They must be taught responsibility. So long as they were kept under strict control they had no opportunity of forming character or of learning to resist temptation. Prison, at the best, could never, he thought, be a very good reformatory. It was primarily—and it must be so—a place of punishment. It was important to remember that punishment did not always involve reformation, and he ventured to think that after a period of punishment came the principal opportunity for reformation.

On the 18th inst., in the House of Commons, the Land Charges Bill, as amended, was coneidered, and on Clause 1 Mr. Caldwell pointed out that the clause provided for the transfer of the office of registrar of judgments to the Land Registry, and then went on to give power to the Lord Chancellor to abolish the office. It seemed to him that there was no very clear reason for abolishing the office, and in order to get some explanation from the Attorney-General, he moved as an amendment the omission of that part of the clause which conferred on the Lord Chancellor the power to abolish the office. The Attorney-General explained that it was the business of the office, and not the office itself, that was transferred to the Land Registry. If the Lord Chancellor found that it was necessary that the office should still continue to exist the power of abolition placed in his hands would doubtless not be unduly exercised. The Bill was subsequently read a third time.

The designs of Mr. Edward W. Mountford, which the Corporation of London have accepted for the new Central Criminal Court, clearly indicate, says the *Standard*, that impressiveness and dignity have been regarded as of primary importance, ornament being introduced only sparingly. The building now to be erected, covering the yard of the old court as well as the site occupied by the gaol, will, on the first-floor, contain four large courts, opening into a spacious central hall, approached by a grand staircase, and surmounted by a dome. A private corridor will connect all the courts with the various retiring rooms set apart for the judges and juries, as also with the apartments of the Lord Mayor, the sheriffs, the recorder, and the common serjeant. Mr. Mountford has put the police cells in direct communication with the dock in each court, while entirely shutting off the cells from those portions of the building to which the public will be admitted. Mr. Mountford has, of course, placed the principal entrance to the building in the Old Bailey. Within will be a spacious entrance-hall, 21 feet high, from which vaulted corridors of the same height and 20 feet wide lead right and left. The principal staircase, 13 feet wide, will face the entrance, and on the right will be a passenger lift, while provision is made in the design for a second lift, should it be required. General waiting-rooms for male and female witnesses are to be provided respectively upon either side of the staircase. Situate at the east end of the Newgate-street corner, in the quietest part of the building, will be the Grand Jury room. The halls and main corridors will be paved with black and white marble, the courts and principal rooms panelled with wainscot oak, and the ceilings formed of fibrous plaster. In the construction of the dome the framework is to consist exclusively of British steel, covered externally with copper. The courts will be lighted entirely from the roof, the outer skylights being of rough plate glass, and the inner domes glazed with white cathedral or similar material, the space between the two surfaces being warmed in order to prevent draughts. Great care has been taken to secure ample ventilation, and it is believed that the method adopted will prevent the air in the building becoming vitiated. Steam ventilating radiators will be relied upon for heating, and the radiators will be so arranged that the occupant of any room may control the supply of air or heat. The cost of the new building, including fittings, will be nearly £300,000.

MARRIAGE.

BELL—NORTON.—On June 12, at Christ Church, Beckenham, by the Rev. Albert R. Hockley, Rector of Countisbury-cum-Lynmouth, Devon (uncle of the bridegroom), assisted by the Rev. J. Rooker, the Vicar, Arthur Douglas Bell, Solicitor (Carter & Bell), of 6, Idol-lane, E.C., to Katherine Jane Norton, second daughter of Bridger Norton, of Southwick, Beckenham.

To SOLICITORS, REAL ESTATE OWNERS, AND REPRESENTATIVES.—We obtain Best Prices for all Quantities of Second-hand and Defective Rails, Scrap Iron, Old Plant, &c. We undertake to SELL for Clients, at a moderate commission, or to Purchase outright where necessary, all Iron, Steel, and Heavy Goods, Castings, &c. Highest references. Write or wire—MORDAUNT LAWSON & Co., Workington, Cumberland (Telegrams: Mordaunt, Workington; Telephone: No. 9), and Branches at Belfast, Birmingham, Carlisle, London, Liverpool, and Middlesborough.—[ADVT.]

COURT PAPERS.

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE.

ROTA OF REGISTRARS IN ATTENDANCE ON

Date.	Appeal Court No. 2.	Mr. Justice Stirling.	Mr. Justice Kekewich.
Monday, June 25	Mr. Beal	Mr. Carrington	Mr. Farmer
Tuesday 26	Pugh	Lavie	King
Wednesday 27	Beal	Carrington	Farmer
Thursday 28	Pugh	Lavie	King
Friday 29	Beal	Carrington	Farmer
Saturday 30	Pugh	Lavie	King

Date.	Mr. Justice Byrne.	Mr. Justice Cozens-Hardy.	Mr. Justice Farwell.	Mr. Justice Buckley.
Monday, June 25	Mr. Godfrey	Mr. Jackson	Mr. Greswell	Mr. King
Tuesday 26	Leach	Pemberton	Church	Farmer
Wednesday 27	Godfrey	Jackson	Greswell	Church
Thursday 28	Leach	Pemberton	Church	Greswell
Friday 29	Godfrey	Jackson	Greswell	Pemberton
Saturday 30	Leach	Pemberton	Church	Jackson

CIRCUITS OF THE JUDGES.

REVISED EDITION.

The following Judge will remain in Town :—DARLING, J., during the whole of the Circuits; the other Judges till their respective Commission Days.

NOTICE.—In cases where no note is appended to the names of the Circuit Towns both Civil and Criminal Business must be ready to be taken on the first working day; in other cases the note appended to the name of the Circuit Town indicates the day before which Civil Business will not be taken. In the case of Circuit Towns to which two Judges go there will be no alteration in the old practice.

SUMMER ASSIZES, 1900. Commission Days.	N. WALES, CHESTER, AND GLAMORGAN. L. C. J. of England	S. WALES AND CHESTER. Grantham, J.	S. EASTERN. Mathew, J. Bigham, J.	OXFORD. Day, J. Bucknill, J.	MIDLAND. Wills, J. Wright, J.	NORTHERN. Channell, J. Phillimore, J.	WESTERN. Lawrance, J. Kennedy, J.	N. EASTERN. Bruce, J. Ridley, J.
Monday May 28			Huntingdon				Salisbury	
Tuesday 29			Cambridge					
Wednesday 30			B.S. Edmunds				Dorchester	
Thursday June 4							Wells	
Tuesday 5			Norwich	Reading*	Aylesbury		Tuesday 12	
Friday 8				Oxford	Bedford		Bodmin	
Saturday 9			Chelmsford	Worcester	Northampton		Exeter 2	
Monday 11								
Tuesday 12			Hertford		Leicester			
Thursday 14			Wednesday 27	Gloucester			Winchester 2	
Monday 18						Appleby		
Tuesday 19			Lewes			Carlisle		
Thursday 21			Tuesday, July 3					
Monday 25				Oakham				
Tuesday 26				Lincoln				
Thursday 28							Bristol 2	Newcastle 2
Friday 29				Monmouth				
Saturday 30						Lancaster		
Monday July 2								
Tuesday 3								
Thursday 5	Newtown							
Friday 6				Hereford				
Saturday 7	Dolgelly							
Monday 9			Maidstone		Derby			
Tuesday 10	Carnarvon	Haverfordwest	Thursday 12			Manchester 2	(End)	Durham 2
Wednesday 11		Lampeter		Shrewsbury				
Thursday 12								
Friday 13		Carmarthen						
Saturday 14	Beaumaris							
Monday 16					Nottingham 2			
Tuesday 17	Ruthin							
Wednesday 18		Brecon	Guildford					
Thursday 19			Friday 20					
Friday 20	Mold	Presteign		Stafford 2				York 2
Saturday 21			(End)		Warwick			
Monday 23		Chester 2						
Tuesday 24								
Wednesday 25						Liverpool 2		Leeds 2
Friday 27		Swansea 2			Birmingham 2			
Saturday 28		(End)		(End)		(End)	(End)	(End)
Saturday Aug. 11								

* Civil Business will be taken at 11 o'clock on the Commission Day.

COURT OF APPEAL.

TRINITY SITTINGS, 1900.

(*Continued from p.* 538.)

FROM THE CHANCERY DIVISION, THE PROBATE, DIVORCE AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION (PROBATE AND DIVORCE), AND THE COUNTY PALATINE AND STANNARIES COURTS.

(General List.)

1900.

The Saccharin Corpn ld v The Anglo-Continental Chemical Works ld appl of defts, Anglo-Continental Chemical Works ld, from of Mr Justice Buckley, dated April 6, 1900 (produce order) April 11

The Saccharin Corpn ld v The Anglo-Continental Chemical Works ld appl of deft, R Reitmeyer, from order of Mr Justice Buckley, dated April 6, 1900 (produce order) April 12

In re Harvey Harvey v Harvey appl of pltff, Richard Baker Gabb, from

order of Mr Justice Kekewich, dated March 13, 1900 (produce order) March 27

The London General Omnibus Co ld v Lavell appl of deft from order of Mr Justice Farwell, dated March 3, 1900 March 27

In re the Lands & Trust Co of Florida, ld & Co's Acts, 1862 to 1898, and Joint Stock Co's Arrangement Act, 1870 appl of Land & Trust Co of Florida and J E Hodges from order of Mr Justice Wright, dated March 14, 1900 March 27

In re the Companies' Act, 1862 to 1890, and In re the London Contract Co ld appl of C H Bull and anr from order of Mr Justice Wright, dated March 14, 1900 March 28

In re the Companies' Act, 1862 to 1890, and In re the Bank of Syria ld appl of John Owen and anr from order of Mr Justice Wright, dated March 7, 1900 March 28

In re the Same, &c appl of G S Barnes from order of Mr Justice Wright, dated March 7, 1900 March 28

In re the Same, &c appl of G S Barnes from order of Mr Justice Wright, dated March 7, 1900 March 28

In re a Contract between S B Bevington and ors and South-Eastern Ry Co and Vendor and Purchasers Act, 1874 appl of South-Eastern Ry Co from order of Mr Justice , dated June 30, 1899 March 28

Hawkes v Leyton Urban District Council appl of defts from order of Mr Justice Buckley, dated Feb 28, 1900 (produce order) March 30

In re Hancock Watson v Watson appl of deft, K Hancock & ors, from order of Mr. Justice Byrne, dated March 3, 1900 April 3

E Wolff & Son v Nopitsch appl of pltffs from order of Mr Justice Cozens-Hardy, dated March 13, 1900 April 3

Tebb v Cave appl of deft from order of Mr Justice Buckley, dated Feb 15, 1900 (produce order) April 5

The Music & Arts Corpn ld v Duncan appl of deft from order of Mr Justice Farwell, dated Feb 7, 1900 (produce order) April 7

Watts v Driscoll appl of deft, D Driscoll, from order of Mr Justice Farwell, dated March 13, 1900 April 10

In re Wellborne (two, &c.) appl of C E Wellborne & anr from order of Mr Justice Kekewich, dated March 23, 1900 April 11

In re Wright Wright v Saunderson appl of J H Gibson from order of Mr Justice Kekewich, dated April 4, 1900 April 12

Daly v Edwards, and Barrington v Edwardes appl of deft, G Edwardes, from order of Mr Justice Kekewich, dated March 2, 1900 (produce order) April 12

Evelyn v Mirrielees appl of pltff from order of Mr Justice Farwell, dated March 12, 1900 April 19

Campbell Davys v Lloyd appl of pltff from order of Mr Justice Bucknill for Mr Justice Stirling, dated April 4, 1900 (produce order) April 19

Reeve v Powell appl of deft from order of Mr Justice Stirling, dated April 7, 1900 April 20

Turner v Trustee of Property of W A Jewell, &c appl of pltff from order of Mr Justice Kekewich, dated March 29, 1900 April 21

In re Williams & James (gents) appl of Messrs Williams & James from order of Mr Justice Byrne, dated March 18, 1900 April 21

Frohwein v Gluck appl of deft from order of Mr Justice Farwell, dated April 3, 1900 April 24

Vaughan v Powell appl of pltff from order of Mr Justice Stirling, dated April 21, 1900 April 25

Ind, Coope & Co, ld v Hamblin appl of deft from order of Mr Justice Buckley, dated January 26, 1900 (order post dated) April 25

The Yorkshire Laundries ld v Pickles appl of pltffs from order of Mr Justice Farwell, dated March 2, 1900 (produce order) April 27

Duchess of Marlborough v Duke of Marlborough appl of deft Duke of Marlborough and ors from order of Mr Justice Byrne, dated April 3, 1900 May 3

Ewart v Fryer appl of defts from order of Mr Justice Kekewich, dated March 28, 1900 May 3

Taylor v Clark appl of deft, M. E. Clark & ors, from order of Mr Justice Farwell, dated March 8, 1900 May 4

In re the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1890, and In re the Puncture Proof Pneumatic Tyre Co, ld appl of the Puncture Proof, &c, Co, ld from order of Mr Justice Wright, dated May 2, 1900 (produce order) May 5

Metropolitan Ry Co v Great Western Ry Co and Mayor, &c, of London appl of defts, Great Western Ry Co, from order of Mr Justice Kekewich, dated March 27, 1900 May 7

Gardner v Hodgson's Kingston Brewery Co, ld appl of deft from order of Mr Justice Cozens-Hardy, dated March 9, 1900 May 8

Stretch v North Staffordshire Ry Co appl of defts from order of Mr Justice Farwell, dated April 24, 1900 May 11

Laycock v Swann appl of deft from order of Mr Justice Farwell, dated April 3, 1900 (produce order) May 11

City of London Electric Lighting Co v The Mayor, &c, of London appl of defts from order of Mr Justice Farwell, dated May 3, 1900 (produce order) May 12

Hawker v King appl of deft from order of Mr Justice Cozens-Hardy, dated April 3, 1900 (produce order) May 12

In re The Companies Acts, 1862 to 1890, and In re Brutton & Burney ld and Burney's New Cross Brewery, ld appl of J Watson & Co ld from order of Mr Justice Byrne, dated April 5, 1900 (produce order) May 15

Tindal v Spitzel appeal of A J Marks from order of Mr Justice Cozens-Hardy, dated Feb 24, 1900 (produce order) May 16

Taylor v London & County Banking Co ld appl of deft S Dixon from order of Mr. Justice Farwell, dated March 19, 1900, & cross-notice of pltff, dated May 21, 1900 May 17

In re T W J Mason Ogden v Mason appl of pltffs from order of Mr Justice Kekewich, dated April 28, 1900 May 18

In re Ann Taylor The Guardians of Edmonton Union v Deeley appl of pltffs from order of Mr. Justice Kekewich, dated May 7, 1900 (produce order) May 21

In re Robinson Pattison v Wilkinson appl of pltff from order of Mr Justice Stirling, dated March 3, 1900 May 21

Pouey v Hordern Gautron v Hordern appl of J P Gautron from order of Mr JusticeFarwell, dated Feb 10, 1900 May 21

Taylor v London and County Banking Co ld appl of pltffs from order of Mr Justice Farwell, dated March 19, 1900 May 22

Attorney-Gen v London County Council appl of defts from order of Mr Justice Cozens-Hardy, dated April 6, 1900 May 22

In re The New Zealand Midland Railway Co ld Smith (on behalf, &c) v Lubbock appl of The Industrial and General Trust ld from an order of Mr Justice Kekewich, dated April 6, 1900 May 24

Christmas v Knowles appl of defts from order of Mr Justice Buckley, dated Feb 1, 1900 May 28

Shuttleworth v Murray appl of defts C W Hill and another from order of Mr Justice Cozens-Hardy, dated March 29, 1900 May 29

In re Clarke Clarke v Clarke appl of defts Sir E. Walter and others from order of Mr Justice Byrne, dated April 26, 1900 May 30

In re Trade-Mark No 25,422 and Patents, Designs, &c, Acts appl of G W Roberts, from order of Mr Justice Farwell, dated December 18, 1899 (produce order) June 1

Eastwood Bros ld v Houley Urban District Council appl of defts from order of Mr Justice Byrne, dated April 7, 1900 June 1

THE PROPERTY MART.

SALES OF THE ENSUING WEEK.

June 26.—Messrs. Debenham, Tewson, Farmer, & Bridgewater, at the Mart, at 2:—Highgate: Leasehold Family Residence, in the highest part of this district, near the Parish Church, a little over a mile from Hampstead-heath. Solicitors, Messrs. Scadding & Bodkin, London.—Lingfield and East Grinstead (on the borders of Surrey and Sussex): Freehold Estate of about 182 acres in extent, about a mile from East Grinstead Station (L.B. and S.C.R.), and a little over an hour's journey from London. Solicitors, Messrs. Guedalla & Cross, London.—Suffolk: Freehold Estate, coveriog a total area of about 217a. 1r. 3p.; about two and a-half miles from Cockfield Station (G.E.R.), eight miles from Bury St. Edmunds, eight miles from Stowmarket, and five from Lavenham. Solicitors, Messrs. Debenham & Walker, London. (See advertisements, June 16, p. 2.)

June 26.—Messrs. Drivers, Jonas, & Co., at the Mart, at 2:—Herefordshire (The Hennor Estate, near Leominster): A Freehold Residential Property, situate about three miles from Leominter, comprising about 646 acres, with mansion, farmhouses, buildings, and numerous cottages; estimated value £1,022 a year. Solicitors, Messrs. St. Barbe Sladen & Wing, London. (See advertisement, June 16, p. 6.)

June 26.—Mr. Alfred Richards, at the Mart, at 2:—Enfield Highway: Eighty-five Acres of Freehold Land, with nearly 4,000 feet to Carterhatch-lane and Hoe-lane. The Home Farm Nurseries, 13 acres, with long main London-road frontage. Twenty-one and a-half Acres of Freehold Land, adjoining Brimsdown Station. Solicitor, Joseph Barrett, Esq., London. (See advertisement, June 9, p. 4.)

June 27.—Messrs. Edwin Fox & Bousfield, at the Mart, at 2:—City of London: Freehold Ground-rent of £220 per annum, secured upon and arising from No 34 Aldersgate-street. Solicitors, Messrs. Cann & Son, London. (See advertisement, June 16, p. 6.)

June 27.—Messrs. Douglas Young & Co., at the Mart, at 2:—Clacton-on-Sea: Small Residential Estates and large areas of Freehold Building Land; land-tax redeemed; free conveyances; in sixty Lots. Solicitors, W. H. Hazard, Esq., London; and Messrs. Hazard & Pratt, Harleston, Norfolk.—Two Policies of Assurance for £400 and £1,000. Solicitors, Messrs. Foss, Ledsam, & Blount, London.—East Dulwich: Twenty-one Freehold Building Plots. (See advertisements, June 16, p 5.)

June 28.—Messrs. Farebrother, Ellis, Egerton, Breach, Galsworthy & Co., at the Mart, at 2:—The Strand: In the finest position, close to Wellington-street, Waterloo Bridge, and the new County Council road, on Building Lease for a term of 80 years, containing in all an area of about 2,177 superficial feet. Solicitors, Messrs. Emanuel Round & Nathan, London.—Suffolk (between Ipswich and Woodbridge, near Bealings Station, and under two hours from London): Freehold Residential Estate, comprising an Elizabethan Mansion, well-timbered park, in all about 214 acres. The Farmery, distinguished as the Manor House, a residence, with buildings, &c. Also Three Lots of Freehold Building Land. Solicitors, Messrs. Steward & Rouse, Ipswich.—Caterham, on the Surrey Hills, within 40 minutes of the City: Freehold Detached Residence. Solicitor, H. Brown, Esq., London.—Oxfordshire, on the borders of Berkshire, and near the Thames: Freehold Residential and Agricultural Properties, in the Parishes of Crowmarsh, Gifford, Newnham Murren, Nuffield and St. Peter's, Wallingford, 15 miles from Reading, comprising nearly 600 acres. Solicitors, Messrs. Powell & Burt, London. (See advertisements, June 16, p. 23).

June 28.—Mr. Walter Hall, at the Mart, at 2: Freehold Business Premises, 19, Golden-square, 20, Brewer-street, and 4, Lower John-street, all let at rentals now amounting to £350 per annum. Solicitors, Messrs. Attree, Johnson, & Ward, London.—Freehold Ground-rents, amounting to £1,837 per annum, secured upon 22 shops and 275 private houses in Sydney-road, Toronto-road, Quebec-road, Montreal-road, and Dock-road, Tilbury, the whole being of the value of about £7,000 per annum. In numerous Lots. Solicitors, Messrs. Horsley & Weightman; Messrs. Ranken, Ford, Ford, & Chester; G. Edward Carpenter, Esq.; and Dr. C. H. Taylor; all of London. (See advertisements, June 16, p. 6.

June 28.—Messrs. C. C. & T. Moore, at the Mart, at 2, in thirteen Lots: Wapping: Freehold Houses, let at £432 per annum. And Leasehold Houses—Three Houses, let at £111 18s.; Twelve Houses, let at £280 per annum; Seventeen Houses, let at £518 1s. per annum; Four Houses, let at £88 8s. per annum; Four Houses, let at £176 16s.; Two Houses, let at £96 3s.—Mile End: Two Houses, let at £44 4s. Solicitors, Messrs. Stones, Morris, & Stone; and Messrs. Brown & Woolnough, of London.—Hackney and Woodford: Freehold Houses and Shops, let on agreements at £30 and £50 per annum. Also, Freehold Houses, let at £50 11s. per annum. Solicitors, Messrs. Reed & Reed, London. (See advertisements, June 16, p. 9.)

June 28.—Messrs. Stimson & Sons at the Mart, at 2:—Brighton: Freehold Residence, Cannon-place, King's-rd; let at £95. Solicitor, F. C. Sheppard, Esq., London.—Spitalfields: An improved Rental of £100 7s per annum, arising from eight Houses and Shops and three Blocks of Dwellings; rack-rents £1,500 per annum. Solicitors, Messrs. Flint & Gardiner, London. (See advertisements, June 14, p. 8.)

June 28.—Messrs. Trollope, at the Mart, at 2:—Freehold Residence, embracing a view of Kensington-gardens, and only three minutes' walk from Kensington High-street Station. Solicitor, J. France Collins, Esq., London. (See advertisement, June 16, p. 8.)

RESULTS OF SALES.

Reversions, Life Policies, &c.

The market for these Interests was extremely brisk at Messrs. H. E. Foster & Cranfield's Fortnightly Sale at the Mart, E.C., on Thursday last, 10 out of the 12 lots offered being sold at exceedingly high prices. The total realized was £13,970. The following are some of the prices:—

REVERSIONS:	£
Absolute to £450; life 60 ... ... Sold	230
To One-eighth of about £5,836; lives 67 and 41...	700

	£
Absolute to One-fourth of £40,000; life 69	Sold 5,525
To One-twelfth of £109,989; to One-twelfth of valuable Freehold Farm of 1,036 acres; also Absolute to One-twelfth of £6,813; lives 51 and 25	,, 4,650
Absolute to Two-thirds of Leaseholds at Holloway, producing £546 4s. per annum; life 80	,, 1,020
Absolute to One-eighth of £1,755; life 54	,, 85
LIFE POLICIES:	
For £4,000 in the Scottish Union and National; life 47	,, 550
For £2,000 in the Scottish Provident; life 61	,, 1,050
Three well-placed Stalls in the Royal Albert Hall, Kensington Gore	,, 110

Messrs. C. C. & T. Moore sold at the Mart, on Thursday, the Block of Artizans' Dwellings in Commercial-street, for £2,820; Five Freehold Shops in Roman-road, £3,860; Four Houses in Forty Acre-lane, Canning Town, £425; a Freehold House in Commercial-road, £300; and a Copyhold Shop in Salmon-lane, £375. Result of sale was £7,780.

WINDING UP NOTICES

London Gazette.—Friday, June 15.

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

Limited in Chancery.

British Boot Industry, Limited—Creditors are required, on or before July 14, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to John Macdonald Henderson, 2, Moorgate st bldgs

Capital and Counties Newspaper Co, Limited—Petn for winding up, presented June 8, directed to be heard on June 26. Braikenridge & Edwards, 16, Bartlett's bldgs, for Nevill & Co, Tamworth, solors for petners. Notice of appearing must reach the above-named not later than 6 o'clock in the afternoon of June 25

Cargona Co, Limited—Creditors are required, on or before June 21, to send in particulars of their claims to W. F. Mason, 263, Edgware rd

Gutta Percha Corporation, Limited—Petn for winding up, presented June 8, directed to be heard on June 26. Riddell & Co, 9, John st, Bedford row, solors for petner. Notice of appearing must reach the above-named not later than 6 o'clock in the afternoon of June 25

Klondyke Parent Pioneer Corporation, Limited—Petn for winding up, presented June 7, directed to be heard on Tuesday, June 26. Ward & Co, 7, King st, Cheapside, solors for petners. Notice of appearing must reach the above-named not later than 6 o'clock in the afternoon of June 25

New Loan Trust and Investment Co, Limited—Creditors are required, on or before July 2, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to William Cash, 90, Cannon st. Church & Co, 9, Bedford row, solors for liquidator

New London Discount Co, Limited—Petn for winding up, presented June 14, directed to be heard on June 26. Riddell & Co, 9, John st, Bedford row, solors for petners. Notice of appearing must reach the above-named not later than 6 o'clock in the afternoon of June 25

Pearse's Liniment Preliminary Syndicate, Limited—Petn for winding up, presented June 18, directed to be heard on June 26. Paddison & Co, 110, Cannon st, solors for petner. Notice of appearing must reach the above-named not later than 6 o'clock in the afternoon of June 25

Samuel Jackson & Sons, Limited—Creditors are required, on or before July 25, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Henry Frederick Hartman, 2, Darley st, Bradford, Yorks. Clough & Crabtree, Cleckheaton, solors for liquidator

Sharp Brothers' Soap and Perfumery Co, Limited—Creditors are required, on or before July 2, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to George Henry Carter, 1, Queen st

Standard Metals Recovery Co, Limited—Petn for winding up, presented June 14, directed to be heard on June 26. Mitchell, 59 and 60, Chancery lane, for Stirk & Co, Wolverhampton, solors for petner. Notice of appearing must reach the above-named not later than 6 o'clock in the afternoon of June 25

Sunbeam Confectionery Co, Limited—Creditors are required, on or before July 16, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Herbert Hoyle, 49, Spring gardens, Manchester. Howard, Manchester, solor to liquidator

Westminster Automatic Telephone Syndicate, Limited—Petn for winding up, presented June 12, directed to be heard on June 26. Taylor, Donington House, Norfolk st, Strand, solor for petner. Notice of appearing must reach the above-named not later than 6 o'clock in the afternoon of June 25

Worcester Dairy, Limited—Creditors are required, on or before July 11, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Harry Day, 5, Foregate st, Worcester. F. & H. Corbett, Worcester, solors to liquidator

County Palatine of Lancaster.

Limited in Chancery.

Bradbury & Co, Limited—Petn for winding up, presented May 25, directed to be heard at the Assize Courts, Strangeways, Manchester, on Monday, June 25, at 10.30. Fripp, 18, Clegg st, Oldham, solor for petner. Notice of appearing must reach the above-named not later than 2 o'clock in the afternoon of June 25

London Gazette.—Tuesday, June 19.

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

Limited in Chancery.

Brighton and South of England Confectionery Co, Limited—Creditors are required, on or before July 30, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to John William Pointing, 32, Clifton st, Brighton. Nye & Treacher, solors to liquidator

Consolidated Gem Group of Murchison Gold Mines, Limited—Creditors are required, on or before Oct 31, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Alfred Augustus James, 5, Coleman st

Edmund Potter & Co, Limited—Creditors are required, on or before Aug 1, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to John Philip Garnett, 22, Booth st, Manchester. Darbishire & Co, Manchester, solors to liquidator

Inlaid Linoleum (Thomson's Patent) Co, Limited—Petn for winding up, presented June 15, directed to be heard on July 10. Jaques & Co, 8, Ely pl, solors for petner. Notice of appearing must reach the above-named not later than 6 o'clock in the afternoon of July 9

John Ryder & Sons, Limited—Creditors are required, on or before July 28, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to J. Townley Trotter, 27, Brazennose st, Manchester. Sutton & Co, Manchester, solors to liquidator

Lithanode Electric Storage Co, Limited (in Liquidation)—Creditors are required, on or before July 19, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts and claims, to Frank Stuttaford, 11, St Helen's pl, solor to liquidator

Tennyson-road Cotton Spinning and Manufacturing Co, Limited—Creditors are required, on or before Wednesday, Aug 1, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Messrs. Dewhurst and Smalley, Tennyson rd, Preston. W. & R. Ascroft, Preston, solors for liquidators

Whitehaven Printing Co, Limited—Creditors are required, on or before July 16, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Andrew Reed, 36, King st, Whitehaven

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED.

Cottage Distillery Mutual Sick and Dividend Society, Cottage Inn, St Vincent st, Ladywood, Birmingham June 11

Friendly Society, Vestry Room, Ramsey, Huntingdon June 11

National Dockers Tontine Friendly Society, 127, Derby rd, Bootle, Liverpool June 14

Tredegar Collieries Workmen's Sick, Accident, and Funeral Society, Temperance Hall, Tredegar, Monmouth June 14

Warning to intending House Purchasers and Lessees.—Before purchasing or renting a house have the Sanitary Arrangements thoroughly Examined, Tested, and Reported upon by an Expert from The Sanitary Engineering Co. (H. Carter, C.E., Manager), 65, Victoria-street, Westminster. Fee quoted on receipt of full particulars. Established 23 years. Telegrams, "Sanitation."—[Advt.]

BANKRUPTCY NOTICES.

London Gazette.—Friday, June 15.

RECEIVING ORDERS.

Aveleck, William Foote, Liverpool, Iron Merchant Liverpool Pet April 27 Ord June 12

Ansell, Henry, Swansea, Cycle Agent Swansea Pet June 12 Ord June 12

Baillie, Charles Innes, Camberwell High Court Pet May 24 Ord June 12

Bates, Isaac, Blackburn, Plumber Blackburn Pet May 25 Ord June 13

Beer & Gash, Wharf rd, City rd, Builders High Court Pet Jan 23 Ord June 12

Bentley, Edwin, Sheepridge, Huddersfield, Plumber Huddersfield Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Bowling, James Thomas, Leyland, Lancs, Slater Bolton Pet June 12 Ord June 12

Bradley, James Oldridge, Selby, Yorks, Publican York Pet May 29 Ord June 11

Brotherhood, Myra Louisa, Barugh, nr Barnsley, York Barnsley Pet June 13 Ord June 13

Church, Edward, Llandyssul, Cardigan, Licensed Victualler Carmarthen Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Curtis, Walter, jun, Stockton on Tees, Grocer Stockton on Tees Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Dobson, Richard Sharpe, New Clecthorpes, Gt Grimsby, Journeyman Joiner Gt Grimsby Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Duxbury, Albert, Accrington, Egg Merchant Blackburn Pet June 13 Ord June 13

Fawcett, John, Halifax, Insurance Agent Halifax Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Fox, Leonard Adolphus, Neath, Glam, Fancy Goods Dealer Neath Pet June 12 Ord June 12

Green, John Hawke, Wool Exchange bldgs High Court Pet March 19 Ord June 1

Gibbs, Charles, Southall, Builder Windsor Pet May 26 Ord June 9

Gill, Harry, and Robert Bidhalgh, Bradford, Wholesale Confectioners Bradford Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Goldstein, Aaron, Whitechapel, Boot Manufacturer High Court Pet June 12 Ord June 12

Gullen, Thomas James, St Leonards on Sea, Upholsterer Hastings Pet June 12 Ord June 12

Hartley, John, Kingston, Portsmouth, Builder Portsmouth Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Holt, John, Margate, Licensed Victualler Canterbury Pet June 11 Ord June 12

Jenkin, Noah, Wenvoe, Glam Cardiff Pet June 12 Ord June 12

Leslie, Henry John, Weymouth st, Portland pl, Theatrical Agent High Court Pet Feb 2 Ord June 13

Lyon, Arthur, Finsbury, Machine Manufacturer High Court Pet May 1 Ord June 13

Mellor, Frederick, Burnley, Journeyman Painter Burnley Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Mott, Hanstead, Bardsea, nr Ulverston, Army Pensioner Barrow in Furness Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Nannelli, Angleo, Golden ln, Hat Manufacturer High Court Pet May 24 Ord June 13

Openshaw, Joseph Thomas, Manchester, Solicitor Manchester Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Peet, George Henry, Newfoundpool, Leicester, Painter Leicester Pet June 13 Ord June 13

Pooley, Edmund, Streatham, Solicitor High Court Pet May 11 Ord June 13

Potter, James, Cilfynydd, nr Pontypridd, Collier Pontypridd Pet June 12 Ord June 12

Reddy, James, Bishopston, Bristol, Flour Dealer Bristol Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Rew, Mary Jane, Exmouth, Lodging house Keeper Exeter Pet June 13 Ord June 13

Rowland, Ernest, Leiston, Suffolk, Grocer Ipswich Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Sampson, Frederick Ernest, Sheffield, Provision Dealer Sheffield Pet June 12 Ord June 12

Seddon, Frank, Twickenham, Tobacconist's Manager Brentford Pet May 21 Ord June 9

Sheldon, William Henry, Rotherham, Valuer Sheffield Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Skipper, Richard Wilmer, King's Lynn, Norfolk, Merchant King's Lynn Pet June 13 Ord June 13

Smith, Maslin, Crewkerne, Somerset, Hotel Keeper Yeovil Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Standidge, Mary Ann Lee, Kingston upon Hull Kingston upon Hull Pet May 19 Ord June 11

Swain, George Edwin, and James Gladstone Winter, Nuneaton, Builders Coventry Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Wellsted, Frederick, Aberdare, General Dealer Aberdare Pet June 13 Ord June 13

West, James Alfred, Fartown, Huddersfield, Labourer Huddersfield Pet June 11 Ord June 11

Westwood, James, Old Hill, Staffs, Fruiterer Dudley Pet June 12 Ord June 12

White, James, Zeal Monachorum, Devon, Farmer Exeter Pet June 9 Ord June 9

White, Oliver James, Fenton, Staffs, Earthenware Manufacturer Stoke upon Trent Pet June 13 Ord June 13

FIRST MEETINGS.

Baker, Arthur James, Southall, Middlesex, Builder June 25 at 3 95, Temple chmbrs, Temple av

Bennett, Frederick James, Brixton, Commission Agent June 25 at 12 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st

Boulding, Arthur James, Sittingbourne, Kent, Coachbuilder June 25 at 11 115, High st, Rochester

Bradley, James Oldridge, Selby, York, Publican June 28 at 11 15 Off Rec, 28, Stonegate, York

Bugg, David, Luton, Beds, Straw Hat Manufacturer June 22 at 12 Chamber of Commerce, 53, George st, Luton

Chapman, Frederick Martin, Bedford June 22 at 11.30 Law Courts, New rd, Peterborough

Cornish, John, Caledonian rd, Butcher June 25 at 11 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st

Davies, James, Ynyshir, Glam, Collier June 25 at 12 135, High st, Merthyr Tydfil

Freeman, Bertram, Uxbridge, Surveyor June 22 at 3 Room 76, Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st

Griffiths, David, Lampeter, Cardigans, Farmer June 26 at 11 Black Lion Hotel, Lampeter

Harris, John Edwin, Newcastle on Tyne, Cycle Dealer June 22 at 11.30 Off Rec, 30, Mosley st, Newcastle on Tyne

Hartley, John, Kingston, Portsmouth, Builder June 22 at 3 Off Rec, Cambridge june, High st, Portsmouth

Harvey, I S, Astwood rd, Cromwell rd June 25 at 2.30 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st

Hey, George, Kingsholm, Glos, Soap Manufacturer June 25 at 3.15 Bell Hotel, Gloucester

Ison, Harry John, Shrewsbury, Salop, Chemist June 22 at 2.30 Off Rec, 42, St John's hill, Shrewsbury

Kendall Edward George, Gunnersbury, Builder June 25 at 12 221, Temple chmbrs, Temple av

Osborn, George Hunt, Kilburn, Music Publisher June 22 at 12 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st

Proberts, Alfred, Walsall, Hatter June 26 at 11.30 Off Rec, Walsall

Rooks, Henry James, Kingsland, Licensed Victualler June 22 at 12 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st

Solomon Ada, Blaina, Mon, Clothier June 22 at 3 135, Merthyr st, Merthyr Tydfil

Swain, George Edwin, and James Gladstone Winter, Nuneaton, Builders June 25 at 12 Off Rec, 17, Hertford st, Coventry

Trimm, Frederick, Walthamstow, Builder June 26 at 2.30 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st

URSELL, FRANCIS WILLIAM, Cheltenham, Pianoforte Dealer June 25 at 11 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st
WARTSKI, S, Dalston ln June 22 at 11 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st
WHITE, JAMES, Zeal Monachorum, Devon, Farmer June 28 at 10.30 Off Rec, 13, Bedford circus, Exeter
WOODHOUSE, JOHN THOMAS, Derby, Greengrocer June 22 at 11 Off Rec, 47, Full st, Derby
WRIGHT, ROBERT, Tallington, Lincoln, Hotel Keeper June 22 at 11.45 Law Courts, New rd, Peterborough
YOUNG, JAMES PICK, Bourne Fen, Lincoln, Labourer June 22 at 11.45 Law Courts, New rd, Peterborough

ADJUDICATIONS.

ADEY, WILLIAM EDWIN, and RICHARD ARCHER, Dewsbury, York, Woollen Manufacturers Dewsbury Pet April 27 Ord May 29
ANSELL, HENRY, Swansea, Cycle Agent Swansea Pet June 12 Ord June 12
BANGS, HERBERT HENRY, High st, Camden Town High Court Pet May 15 Ord June 12
BELFIELD, THOMAS WILLIAM, Hollington, Stafford, Farmer Stoke upon Trent Pet May 25 Ord June 13
BENTLEY, EDWIN, Sheepridge, Huddersfield, Plumber Huddersfield Pet June 11 Ord June 11
BLAKEY, WILLIAM JOHN, Stockton on Tees, Wholesale Stationer Stockton on Tees Pet May 19 Ord June 11
BOWLING, JAMES THOMAS, Leyland, Lancs, Flagger Bolton Pet June 12 Ord June 12
BROTHERHOOD, MYRA LOUISA, Barugh, nr Barnsley, York, Barnsley Pet June 13 Ord June 13
BUCKLEY, JOHN EUGENE, Copthall av, Turf Commission Agent High Court Pet May 14 Ord June 9
CHURCH, EDWARD, Llandyssul, Cardigans, Licensed Victualler Carmarthen Pet June 11 Ord June 11
COLLENS, WILLIAM JOHN, Old Kent rd, Grocer High Court Pet June 5 Ord June 9
CURTIS, WALTER, jun, Stockton on Tees, Grocer Stockton on Tees Pet June 11 Ord June 11
DANIEL, GEORGE WILLIAM, Aston Cross, Birmingham, Pork Butcher Birmingham Pet June 7 Ord June 12
DOBSON, RICHARD SHARPE, New Cleethorpes, Great Grimsby, Journeyman Joiner Great Grimsby Pet June 11 Ord June 11
DUXBURY, ALBERT, Accrington, Egg Merchant Blackburn Pet June 13 Ord June 13
EASTON, WILLIAM LEWINS, Blyth, Northumberland, Potato Merchant Newcastle on Tyne Pet May 19 Ord June 8
FAWCETT, JOHN, Halifax, Insurance Agent Halifax Pet June 11 Ord June 11
FOX, LEONARD ADOLPHUS, Neath, Glam, Fancy Goods Dealer Neath Pet June 12 Ord June 12
GILL, HARRY, and ROBERT RIDEHALGH, Bradford, Confectioners Bradford Pet June 11 Ord June 11
GOLDSTEIN, AARON, Whitechapel, Boot Manufacturer High Court Pet June 12 Ord June 12
HALL, LOUIS WILLIAM, Redhill, Surrey, Grocer Croydon Pet June 6 Ord June 11
HARRIS, JOHN EDWIN, Newcastle on Tyne, Cycle Dealer Newcastle on Tyne Pet May 21 Ord June 11
HARTLEY, JOHN, Kingston, Portsmouth, Builder Portsmouth Pet June 11 Ord June 11
JENKIN, NOAH, Wenvoe Cardiff Pet June 12 Ord June 12
MATTEI, TITO, Portsdown rd, Maida Vale, Professor of Music High Court Pet April 20 Ord June 12
MELLOR, FREDERICK, Burnley, Journeyman Painter Burnley Pet June 11 Ord June 11
MEREDITH, CHARLES AUGUSTUS, Cardiff, Butcher Cardiff Pet May 10 Ord June 12
MORTON, WILLIAM, Southport, Fruiterer Liverpool Pet May 30 Ord June 13
MOTT, HANSTEAD, Bardsea, nr Ulverston, Lancs, Army Pensioner Barrow in Furness Pet June 11 Ord June 11
OPENSHAW, JOSEPH THOMAS, Manchester, Solicitor Manchester Pet June 11 Ord June 11
PEARSON, FREDERICK THOMAS, Hove, Sussex, Solicitor Brighton Pet April 9 Ord June 13
PEET, GEORGE HENRY, Newfoundpool, Leicester, Painter Leicester Pet June 13 Ord June 13
POTTER, JAMES, Cilfynydd, nr Pontypridd, Collier Pontypridd Pet June 12 Ord June 12
REDDY, JAMES, Bishopston, Bristol, Flour Dealer Bristol Pet June 11 Ord June 11
REW, MARY JANE, Exmouth, Lodging house Keeper Exeter Pet June 13 Ord June 13
ROWLAND, ERNEST, Leiston, Suffolk, Grocer Ipswich Pet June 11 Ord June 11
SAMPSON, FREDERICK ERNEST, Sheffield, Provision Dealer Sheffield Pet June 12 Ord June 12
SKIPPER, RICHARD WILLMER, King's Lynn, Norfolk, Merchant King's Lynn Pet June 13 Ord June 13
SMITH, MASLIN, Crewkerne, Hotel Keeper Yeovil Pet June 11 Ord June 11
SUCDEN, ELPHINSTONE AGNES, Chalfont St. Peter's, Bucks Windsor Pet Feb 19 Ord June 8
SWAIN, GEORGE EDWIN, and JAMES GLADSTONE WINTER, Nuneaton, Builders Coventry Pet June 11 Ord June 11
TAUSTON, HUGH GROSVENOR, Hart st, Bloomsbury, Solicitor High Court Pet May 26 Ord June 12
WALLIS, FREDERICK, Canterbury, Grocer Canterbury Pet May 12 Ord June 12
WALTON, GEORGE, Nelson, Lancs, Boot Dealer Burnley Pet May 14 Ord June 13
WEIGEL, BARNET, Maxilla gdns, Notting Hill, Diamond Dealer High Court Pet April 10 Ord June 12
WELLSTED, FREDERICK, Aberdare, General Dealer Aberdare Pet Ord June 13 Ord June 13
WEST, JAMES ALFRED, Fartown, Huddersfield, Labourer Huddersfield Pet June 11 Ord June 11
WESTWOOD, JAMES, Old Hill, Staffs, Fruiterer Dudley Pet June 12 Ord June 12
WHITE, JAMES, Zeal Monachorum, Devon, Farmer Exeter Pet June 9 Ord June 9
WHITE, JOHN, Bexhill on Sea, Builder Canterbury Pet May 31 Ord June 13
WHITE, OLIVER JAMES, Fenton, Staffs, Earthenware Manufacturers Stoke upon Trent Pet June 13 Ord June 13
WILLARD, RICHARD, Hove, Sussex, Tailor Brighton Pet May 15 Ord June 13
WOODCOCK, REGINALD, Manor Park, Essex, Grocer High Court Pet May 24 Ord June 12
WRIGHT, ARTHUR GEORGE, Dudley, Musical Instrument Dealer Dudley Pet May 14 Ord June 11

ADJUDICATION ANNULLED.

APTER, WILLIAM, Denton, nr Darlington, Clerk in Holy Orders Stockton on Tees Adjud April 16, 1894 Annul June 11, 1900

London Gazette.—TUESDAY, June 19.

RECEIVING ORDERS.

ARMER, ANTHONY, Killington, Westmorland, Farmer Kendal Pet June 16 Ord June 16
BOOTH, GEORGE, Ecclesfield, York, Carter Sheffield Pet June 14 Ord June 14
CHARNOCK, JOSEPH EDWARD, Haulgh, Bolton, Draper Bolton Pet June 15 Ord June 15
CLEM, JOHN CHARLES, Bath, Baker Bath Pet June 16 Ord June 16
CONSTABLE, WILLIAM, jun, East Malling, Butcher Maidstone Pet June 15 Ord June 15
CULL, GEORGE, Hounslow, Grocer Brentford Pet June 15 Ord June 15
DENTON, JAMES, Hendon, Builder Barnet Pet May 11 Ord June 13
DODD, ROBERT, Grangetown, Cardiff, Draper Cardiff Pet June 9 Ord June 14
DOUGHTY, THOMAS WILLIAM, Ilford, Essex, Engineer Chelmsford Pet May 21 Ord June 13
ELLIOTT, ROBERT, Dudley, Draper Dudley Pet June 14 Ord June 14
EYRE, THOMAS, Manchester, Wholesale Grocer Manchester Pet June 16 Ord June 16
GADSBY, GEORGE Walsall, Builder Walsall Pet June 13 Ord June 13
GARNER, J S, Portsdown rd, Maida Vale High Court Pet Nov 9 Ord June 15
GRIFFITHS, ISAAC, Tybryn Pencoed, Glam Cardiff Pet June 15 Ord June 15
GRIFFIN, JOSEPH ERNEST, Burton on Trent Manchester Pet May 19 Ord June 14
HALL, THOMAS PARSONS, Southsea, Builder Portsmouth Pet June 15 Ord June 15
HALLADAY, EDWARD, Halifax, Blacksmith Halifax Pet May 23 Ord June 14
HANSON, CHARLES HENRY, Wakefield, Saddler Wakefield Pet June 14 Ord June 14
HARDING, BENJAMIN, Pershore, Draper Worcester Pet June 13 Ord June 13
HARGREAVES, WILLIAM, and CHRISTOPHER HARGREAVES, Nelson, Lancs, Cotton Manufacturers Burnley Pet June 15 Ord June 15
HEYWOOD, R M, Hammersmith High Court Pet April 27 Ord June 15
HOPKINS, HENRY, Heneage st, Spitalfields, Milk Dealer High Court Pet May 26 Ord June 15
ISAACS, LOUIS H, Carlisle pl, Victoria st High Court Pet May 15 Ord June 15
JENNINGS, BARBARA, Newcastle on Tyne, Florist Newcastle on Tyne Pet June 11 Ord June 11
LEVIN & CO. A, Sandringham rd, Fur Merchants High Court Pet May 19 Ord June 15
MEDLICOTT, ALBERT EDWARD, Smethwick, Stafford, Corn Factor West Bromwich Pet June 16 Ord June 16
MOFFATT, JOHN, Manchester, Commission Agent Manchester Pet May 25 Ord June 14
NEWMAN, HENRY, Sandhurst, Glos, Farmer Gloucester Pet May 30 Ord June 15
PEACH, JOHN HENRY, Peterborough, Poulterer Peterborough Pet June 15 Ord June 15
PRITCHARD, ROBERT, Clynnog, Carnarvon, Pig Dealer Bangor Pet June 15 Ord June 15
RATCLIFF, HENRY GEORGE, Sydenham, Kent, Plumber Greenwich Pet June 14 Ord June 14
SHERATON, HARRY RICHARD, and JOHN BARTON TYRER, Liverpool, Timber Merchants Liverpool Pet June 16 Ord June 16
SLAUGHTER, WILLIAM JAMES, Horsham, Sussex, Plumber Brighton Pet June 15 Ord June 15
STATTARD, WILLIAM FREDERICK, Welbeck st, Hotel Proprietor High Court Pet June 15 Ord June 15
WEBB, E A, Eastbourne Lewes Pet May 28 Ord June 15
WREN, HARRY, Maidstone, Licensed Victualler Maidstone Pet June 14 Ord June 14

Amended notice substituted for that published in the London Gazette of June 12:

GRIFFITHS, WILLIAM JOHN, and THOMAS BATSON, Bristol, Chair Manufacturers Bristol Pet June 9 Ord June

FIRST MEETINGS.

ANSELL, HENRY, Swansea, Cycle Agent June 26 at 12 Off Rec, 31, Alexandra rd, Swansea
BAILLIE, CHARLES INNES, Camberwell, Public house Broker June 28 at 11 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st
BARRETT, EPHRAIM, JAMES WILLIAM BARRETT, and FRANK BARRETT, Oldham, Plumbers June 29 at 11.30 Off Rec, Bank chmbrs, Queen st, Oldham
BEER & GASH, Wharf rd, City rd, Builders June 26 at 12 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st
BENTLEY, EDWIN, Sheepridge, Huddersfield, Plumber June 27 at 12 19, John William st, Huddersfield
BOWLING, JAMES THOMAS, Leyland, Lancs, Flagger June 26 at 2 Off Rec, Exchange st, Bolton
BRACEGIRDLE, JOSEPH, Newport in Astbury, Cheshire, Farmer June 28 at 10.45 Off Rec, 23, King Edward st, Macclesfield
BURTON, WALTER, Leicester, Glass Dealer June 26 at 3 Off Rec, 1, Berridge st, Leicester
CARTER, HENRY, Darlington, Durham, Joiner June 27 at 3 Off Rec, 8, Albert rd, Middlesborough
CHURCH, EDWARD, Llandyssul, Cardigans, Licensed Victualler July 4 at 3.30 Off Rec, 4, Queen st, Carmarthen
COLDWELL, HERBERT ALBERT BRAMHAM, Barnsley, Yorks, Colliery Driftsman June 26 at 10.15 Off Rec, Regent st, Barnsley
CONSTABLE, WILLIAM, jun, East Malling, Kent, Butcher June 28 at 11 Off Rec, 9, King st, Maidstone
DANIEL, GEORGE WILLIAM, Birmingham, Pork Butcher June 17 at 11 174, Corporation st, Birmingham
FIELDING, WALTER METCALFE, Oldham, Stationer June 27 at 3 Off Rec, Bank chmbrs, Queen st, Oldham
FRY, CHARLES, Dover, Dairyman June 28 at 9 Off Rec, 63, Castle st, Canterbury
GIBBS, CHARLES, Southall, Builder June 26 at 3 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st
GOLDSTEIN, AARON, Whitechapel, Boot Manufacturer June 26 at 11 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st
GRIFFIN, JOSEPH ERNEST, Burton on Trent June 27 at 2 30 Off Rec, Byrom st, Manchester
GRIFFITHS, WILLIAM JOHN, and THOMAS BATSON, Bristol, Chair Manufacturers June 27 at 12.15 Off Rec, Baldwin st, Bristol
GULLEN, THOMAS JAMES, St Leonards on Sea, Upholsterer June 26 at 11 County Court Offices, 24, Cambridge rd, Hastings
HALL, LOUIS WILLIAM, Redhill, Surrey, Grocer June 28 at 3 24, Railway app, London Bridge
HARDING, BENJAMIN, Pershore, Draper June 27 at 11.45 45, Copenhagen st, Worcester
HILTON, WILLIAM HENRY, Lower Clapton, Auctioneer June 26 at 12 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st
HODGSON, WILLIAM, Glaisdale, York, Joiner June 27 at 3 Off Rec, 8, Albert rd, Middlesborough
JENKIN, NOAH, Wenvoe, Glam June 29 at 12 Off Rec, 117, St Mary st, Cardiff
JENNINGS, BARBARA, Newcastle on Tyne, Florist June 29 at 11.30 Off Rec, 30, Mosley st, Newcastle on Tyne
JOSE, J O, Eastbourne, Builder June 26 at 1.45 Coles & Sons, Seaside rd, Eastbourne
KING, HENRY, Lisle St, Soho, Harness Maker June 26 at 2 30 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st
LESLIE, HENRY JOHN, Weymouth st, Portland pl, Theatrical Agent June 27 at 12 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st
LYON, ARTHUR, Tabernacle st, Finsbury, Machine Manufacturer June 27 at 12 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st
MEREDITH, CHARLES AUGUSTUS, Cardiff, Butcher June 27 at 12 Off Rec, 117, St Mary st, Cardiff
MILLER, HERBERT STANLEY, Redland, Bristol, Commission Agent June 27 at 12 Off Rec, Baldwin st, Bristol
NANNELLI, ANGELO, Golden ln, Hat Manufacturer June 27 at 2.30 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st
NEEDHAM, LUKE, Cleobury Mortimer, Salop, Dealer June 27 at 12 Off Rec, Wolverhampton st, Dudley
OPENSHAW, JOSEPH THOMAS, Manchester, Solicitor June 27 at 3 Off Rec, Byrom st, Manchester
PEET, GEORGE HENRY, Newfound Pool, Leicester, Painter June 26 at 12.30 Off Rec, 1, Berridge st, Leicester
REDDY, JAMES, Bishopston, Bristol, Flour Dealer June 27 at 12.45 Off Rec, Baldwin st, Bristol
REW, MARY JANE Exmouth, Lodging house Keeper June 28 at 10.15 Off Rec, 13, Bedford circus, Exeter
ROBERTS, ROBERT, Criccieth, Carnarvons, Builders July 7 at 11.30 Sportsman Hotel, Portmadoc
ROBINSON, ALFRED, and ARTHUR THOMAS SYKES, Stockton on Tees, Drapers June 29 at 12 45 Queen's Hotel, Leeds
ROWLAND, ERNEST, Leiston, Suffolk, Grocer July 13 at 3 Off Rec, 36, Princes st, Ipswich
SAMPSON, FREDERICK ERNEST, Sheffield, Provision Dealer June 28 at 12 Off Rec, Figtree ln, Sheffield
SYMONS, WILLIAM ANDREW, Plymouth, Butcher June 28 at 11 6, Athenæum ter, Plymouth
WEST, JAMES ALFRED, Fartown, Huddersfield, Labourer June 27 at 12 19, John William st, Huddersfield
WHITE, JOHN, Bexhill on Sea, Builder June 26 at 3 Saracen's Head Hotel, Ashford
WREN, HARRY, Maidstone, Licensed Victualler June 28 at 10.30 Off Rec, 9, King st, Maidstone

ADJUDICATIONS.

ARMER, ANTHONY, Kidlington, Westmorland, Farmer Kendal Pet June 16 Ord June 16
BOOTH, GEORGE, Ecclesfield, York, Carter Sheffield Pet June 14 Ord June 14
CHARNOCK, JOSEPH EDWARD, Haulgh, Bolton, Draper Bolton Pet June 15 Ord June 15
CLEM, JOHN CHARLES, Bath, Baker Bath Pet June 16 Ord June 16
CONSTABLE, WILLIAM, jun, East Malling, Butcher Maidstone Pet June 15 Ord June 15
CULE, EVAN, Radyr, Grocer Pontypridd Pet May 15 Ord June 15
CULL, GEORGE, Hounslow, Grocer Brentford Pet June 15 Ord June 15
ELLIOTT, ROBERT, Dudley, Draper Dudley Pet June 14 Ord June 14
EYRE, THOMAS, Manchester, Wholesale Grocer Manchester Pet June 16 Ord June 16
GADSBY, GEORGE, Walsall, Builder Walsall Pet June 13 Ord June 13
GOODING, CHARLES, Fenchurch st, Leather Merchant High Court Pet Feb 23 Ord June 15
GRIFFIN, JOSEPH ERNEST, Burton on Trent Manchester Pet May 19 Ord June 14
GULLEN, THOMAS JAMES, St Leonards on Sea, Upholsterer Hastings Pet June 12 Ord June 15
HALLADAY, EDWARD, Halifax, Blacksmith Halifax Pet May 23 Ord June 14
HARDING, BENJAMIN, Pershore, Draper Worcester Pet June 13 Ord June 13
HARGREAVES, WILLIAM, and CHRISTOPHER HARGREAVES, Nelson, Lancs, Cotton Manufacturers Burnley Pet June 15 Ord June 15
KENDALL, EDWARD GEORGE, Gunnersbury, Builder Brentford Pet May 17 Ord June 15
LIDDELOW, CHARLES, Victoria st, Contractor Hastings Pet May 16 Ord June 15
PEACH, JOHN HENRY, Peterborough, Poulterer Peterborough Pet June 15 Ord June 15
PRITCHARD, ROBERT, Clynnog, Carnarvon, Pig Dealer Bangor Pet June 15 Ord June 15
RATCLIFF, HENRY GEORGE, Sydenham, Kent, Plumber Greenwich Pet June 14 Ord June 14
SHERATON, HARRY RICHARD, and JOHN BARTON TYRER, Liverpool, Timber Merchants Liverpool Pet June 16 Ord June 16